

CHAD 2013: THE IMPOSSIBLE REHABILITATION OF A NOTORIOUS DICTATOR

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Introduction

Idriss Déby was applauded when he stood beside François Hollande in Bamako on 19 September 2013. He is now positioning himself as an unavoidable bulwark in the face of Islamist terror in Africa or a potential sub-contractor for military and peacekeeping operations. **The Chadian dictator has emerged from the war in Mali with his position strongly reinforced.** On 18 October 2013 he obtained for Chad a seat as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. The French Government allied its army in the fight against 'Jihadism' in the Sahel Desert with the troops of a Head of State who is one of the worst dictators in Africa.

Events in 2013 marked by French influence in the Sahel mask the tragic reality of the Chadian regime. Therefore, to “**rehabilitate**” a dictator as notorious as Déby has necessitated the concealment of many different aspects of Chadian history: the civil wars, the massacres and the crimes committed by the army, the underdevelopment, the hijacking of the oil windfall, fraudulent elections, repression of democratic debate, of freedom of the press and of civil society.

This beginning of a French “amnesty” for the crimes of the Chadian President will benefit all African dictators whose own crimes are of lesser magnitude or concomitant to his. The resulting rehabilitation of African leaders is one of the clearest signs that France has **abandoned its policy of “breaking with Françafrique”**, which could only have happened if Paris had definitely distanced itself from the Françafrique dictators, and had rapidly reinforced its support for democratic forces.

Instead of the expected and long-awaited change in policy, **France has put in place a policy based on “Peace and Security” without paying due consideration to the natures of the regimes it is dealing with.** French policy seems to have backed away from the “comprehensive approach” advocated by the European External Action Service which, in theory, has not abandoned democratization in favor of a policy of security. This highlights the level of influence the French army has not only over Chad but over French policy itself. The absence of truth and justice about military cooperation with Chad is a reminder that the French army has not yet undergone the reforms necessary to distance it from the way in which it structured Françafrique.

1. 23 Years of Power, 23 Years of Civil War

Since 1990, as in the period before Idriss Déby took power, **there has been one civil war after another in Chad.** He is himself a rebel leader, albeit more successful than others. His reign is centered on the start of oil production. Because levels of oil production need to be anticipated over several decades, oil companies need stable political regimes. The rebellions came about initially in response to Déby's seizure of power, then in response to massacres during those rebellions, because of the ethnic makeup of the army, the hijacking of oil revenues by the presidential family and, increasingly, because of the impossibility of political change.

The History of Rebellions and Civil Wars from 1990 to 2013

1991-1992 (1995)	Lake Chad: pro-Habré rebellion by the Movement for Democracy and Development (MDD) by Moussa Medallah Mahamat Seid (Buduma people of Lake Chad and Kanembu people of Kanem)
1991 October	Guéra region: mutiny (attempted coup d'état?) 13 October 1991: Malmoud Bada Abbas (Chadian Army and MPS like Déby), colonels Kaffine and Garboubou.
February 1992 to April 1993	Council of National Revival for Peace and Democracy (CSNPD) of Colonel Moïse Kété at N'Djamena from 21 February, followed by Logone and then, in 1993, Lake Chad and the South (Logone Oriental Region).

1993 Summer	Ouaddaï : Gniguilim and Chokoyane: Rally for Democracy and Liberty (RDL) of Captain Mahamat Nour Abdelkerim
From August 1994 to March 1998	Logone Occidental (South and West, and Moyen-Chari): Armed Forces of the Federal Republic (FARF) of Laoukein Bardé
1998 February	South : Sarh : Democratic Popular Front (FDP) of Mahamout Nahor
1999	Ouaddaï : Abéché : Chadian National Front (FNT) of Doctor Bachar Harris
From March 1999 to end of 2000	Tibesti : Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT) of Youssouf Togoïmi (in 2013 the MDJT still exists in the South of Libya, led by Hissein Yaya Barka)
2003	<i>Central African Republic, participated in replacing President Patassé by Bozizé</i>
2004 - 2009	<i>Sudan: War in Darfur: crossover alliances between rebellions in Sudan and Chad.</i>
2004	East + Darfur: Platform for Change, Unity and Democracy—Socle pour l'unité nationale et la démocratie ((SCUD), deserters from the military of Chad united around Yaya Dillo.
2006 April to December	N'Djamena +East: United Front for Change (FUC) of Mahamat Nour, armed by Sudan and al-Bashir.
2006 (dec05) – 2008(2010)	East: Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD) and other rebellions (UFDD = coalition of FUC, RND, CDR, UFPD, RAFAT et RPJ)
2008, 2 and 3 February	N'Djamena and its suburbs + East: Unified Military Command (UFDD) of General Mahamat Nouri, Fundamental-UFDD of Abdelwahid Aboud Mackaye and Rally of Democratic Forces (RFC) of Tom and Timan Erdimi
2008-2009	East: Union for Force and Resistance (UFR) led by Timan Erdimi coalition of Front for the Salvation of the Republic (FSR), Renewed Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDDR-R), National Movement for Recovery (MNR), National Movement and Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT)
2008 February, 2009	<i>Central African Republic (CAR) : Popular Front for Recovery (FPR)</i>
2013	<i>Mali: intervention of 2,200 Chadian soldiers</i>
2013	<i>Central African Republic (CAR): support given to Seleka and then participation in the Multinational Force of Central Africa (FOMAC)</i>
November 2013	<i>Sudan: fighting against the rest of the Union for Strength and Resistance – l'Union pour la Force et la Résistance (UFR)</i>

Marielle Debos, a researcher whose work centers on Chad, speaks of “**government by force of arms**”, “a form of government whose role is to rein in the soldiery and to grant impunity to a number of armed men, who will not be formally integrated into the regular forces. Because they enjoy impunity, they are free to indulge in illegal and violent practices. These practices are also a means of monitoring and controlling the population”¹, in a “**between wars**” context, meaning an in-between situation of “neither war nor peace”, in which, “...armed men come and go between the regular forces and rebellions”, with “many passages from one rebel faction to another, with stints in the neighboring countries of Libya, Sudan and the Central African Republic.” Weapons circulate in large numbers in Chad. Poverty creates a labor force that can be mobilized, and Chadians are inexpensive mercenaries.

¹ 18 August 2013, Marielle Debos: in Chad, ‘there is a history and a style of government marked by violence’: <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130818-marielle-debos-tchad-violence-rebellion> + ‘Le métier des armes au Tchad. Le gouvernement de l’entre-guerres – The Profession of Carrying Arms in Chad. Government Between Two Wars’, by Marielle Debos, Paris, Karthala, 2013.

According to Marielle Debos,² “Chad is not a ‘failed state’, it is governed by arms. The political arena has never been pacified. Impunity and lack of justice are different from the lack of a State. Disorder is organized and politically productive. Impunity is organized daily through the “untouchables” or through orders given via “unnumbered decrees”. Dysfunctionality corresponds to a form of government. Government by arms goes beyond the violence of the state: predatory positions are distributed with impunity. For stability and peace there are three key issues that have been neglected: rights, civil (and not armed) mobilization and distribution of resources (oil revenues). The need is get away from the “between-wars” situation.”

The **Republican Guard**, which makes up most of the Chadian army, is concentrically organized according to a clan-based schema: the bodyguards are mostly made up of the first circle of Idriss Déby’s relatives, a second circle mostly comes from the Zaghawa ethnic group (Bideyat) along with some Arabs (Déby has avoided giving the whole line of command solely to the Zaghawas)³, because of his wife, and a third circle is made up of troops from other ethnic groups.

French leaders, when allying themselves with Chadian soldiers in the conflict in Mali, have carefully avoided mentioning why Déby’s army is so strong. **The Chadian army has benefited from the increase in oil revenues:** the State budget increased from 390 billion CFA Francs in 2002 to 1500 billion CFA Francs in 2012 (from €595 million, approximately \$800 million, to €2.3 billion, or about \$3.1 billion)⁴ “CCFD-Terres solidaires”, the biggest development NGO in France, has provided some numbers (which would need to be verified) about **arms purchases:** between 2004 and 2008, military spending increased from 35.4 billion FCFA (€50 million) to 275.7 billion CFA Francs (€420 million) annually. After dipping in 2009 to 147 billion CFA Francs it increased again in 2010 to 154.5 billion CFA Francs (€240 million)⁵. In the contract with the World Bank to finance the Chad-Cameroon pipeline, Chad pledged to keep 10% of the revenues in a “Future Generations Fund” and, from the sum that remained, “80% should be spent on priority sectors for development, 5% for the Doba region and no more than 15% should go to the state budget”: this contract has not been honored and a large part of the money has been used to purchase weapons,⁶ even if there has been improvement since 2009.

On 19 June 2013, the NGO “Watchlist”, which specializes in the subject of **child soldiers** demanded the exclusion of Chadian troops from the UN peacekeeping forces in Mali, “for as long as Chad’s military remains on a UN ‘list of shame’ and has not implemented its plan to end child recruitment.”⁷ It is likely that under international pressure Idriss Déby will resolve this issue.

During 23 years of dictatorship, rebellions in Chad have followed one after the other. The February 2008 battle of N’Djamena nearly unseated Déby; he was saved only by French intervention. **Democracy would permit sustainable peace through a legitimate electoral process and a better distribution of wealth.** In the meantime, Idriss Déby stays in power through force of arms and by juggling with French support. Unfortunately, because of the many rebellions over the last 23 years, the boundaries between politicians, activists and former rebel leaders are not clearly defined, and it is the same among the refugees outside Chad. This mixture doesn’t favor the emergence of a culture of democracy that could lead to a peaceful transition. There too the situation is blocked at a stage where **politico-military strategies undermine the organization of a democratic opposition.**

² Marielle Debos, 21 November 2013, Paris, at a presentation of her book ‘Le métier des armes au Tchad. Le gouvernement de l’entre-guerres - The Profession of Arms in Chad. Between-wars Government’

³ 17 August 2010, ICG : ‘Tchad: au delà de l’apaisement’, p. 18 :

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/fr/regions/afrique/afrique-centrale/tchad/162-chad-beyond-superficial-stability.aspx>

⁴ 19 March 2013, ‘Le Tchad dix ans après les premiers barils de pétrole- Chad ten years after the first barrels of petrol’, economie.jeuneafrique.com

⁵ 30 January 2012, Rapport CCFD-Terre Solidaire ‘Le développement piégé : les transferts d’armes et le développement du Tchad (2005 – 2010)’ : La France et d’autres pays ont vendu des armes au Tchad, http://ccfd-terresolidaire.org/ewb_pages/d/doc_2739.php?PHPSESSID=248a290fe4fef24669f77f4b4d11f036

⁶ 11 May 2013, ‘Au Tchad, la répartition de la manne pétrolière suscite le mécontentement—In Chad dividing up the oil bonanza creates discontent’, lemonde.fr

⁷ 20 June 2013, ‘Des centaines d’enfants soldats au Mali—Hundreds of Child Soldiers inMali,’

http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2013/06/20/des-centaines-d-enfants-soldats-au-mali_3433329_3212.html, Washington Post: <http://watchlist.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/WashPost-Article-June-19-20131.pdf>

2. Massacres, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity

Massacres by the Republican Guard, extra-judicial executions, executions of opponents, burned villages, tortured and executed prisoners: a statement of account for Déby's reign will be very difficult to compile. An inventory of the crimes is nearly impossible to establish, because human rights organizations face severe limitations in how much they can investigate in Chad.

Human rights defenders and journalists are in danger and isolated, because repression also targets those who support them. On February 16 1992, the lawyer Joseph Behidi vice-president of the Chadian League for Human Rights (LTDH) was assassinated. In 2013, Idriss Déby continues to imprison and expel his opponents, and to corrupt journalists and human rights activists and politicians. During his 23-year reign of terror, investigations have been blocked and are impossible to conduct far from N'Djamena. Undertaking travel to investigate a massacre that has taken place in a village is dangerous. Even human rights organizations which are otherwise known for drawing up critical assessments of the regime cannot take the risk of investigating everywhere and they live in fear of sanctions. A "village" in the Chadian sense of the word can mean between 5,000, 10,000 or even 15,000 inhabitants. It is impossible to put a number on the people who have disappeared or been killed in massacres perpetrated by Chadian state forces in villages—often being burned to death during the fighting. Detailed information can be found about small scale massacres, but the paradox is only apparent, because further investigation would require protection from the very state involved in the crimes.

Freedom of the Press can exist only if there is a Press, free, not corrupted, that disposes of a minimum of resources. Under Habré there was absolutely no press freedom. Under Déby, there are radio stations and private newspapers, but with very few resources. The Press has been shrunk to a minimum though intimidation, repression and corruption. The good journalists are forced into exile and then often cut off from their sources of information. Internet has provided some improvement but the internet arrived late and quite a while after heaviest massacres.

Déby guarantees impunity to those who execute his orders. For example, in July 2013, the Chadian justice system, at the end of investigations led by a governmental commission of inquiry into the disappearance of the opposition leader Ibni Oumar Saleh, dismissed the case with a comment which acknowledged that, "although it was effectively soldiers of the Presidential Guard who kidnapped the politician, it has proved impossible to identify them".⁸ Through the National Security Agency (ANS), the political police, Déby takes part personally in arrests, torture, and some killings. The ANS quarters are right next to the presidential palace, where Déby lives.

Most of the major massacres took place in the 1990s and were linked to the wars between the Chadian army and rebellions. Documents from the French NGO "Survie" and from FX Verschave, from human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and FIDH, and political opponents like Yorongar have been used to establish an initial **list of "alleged massacres"** (see the list of sources in the bibliography). Since conditions have not allowed for complete and thorough investigations, items of information need to be checked. Different source documents do not speak of the same facts.

⁸ 30 September 2013, Jean Bernard Padaré : l'avocat qui construit scientifiquement la perte d'Idriss Deby ITNO'
<http://www.ndjamena-matin.com/article-tchad-jean-bernard-padare-l-avocat-qui-construit-scientifiquement-la-perde-d-idriss-deby-itno-120325040.html>

A. 1990-2013: Massacres under President Idriss Déby

Date	Event, Massacre	Source	Estimate
1990-1993	Extra-judicial executions, disappearances in the same detention centers as for those who opposed Habré, torture.	Amnesty: The Habré Legacy, October 2001 amnesty.org . Amnesty quoted by survie.org	800 killed (Amnesty, according to Survie 1996)
1990-1993	Systematic rape	Verschave according to Amnesty reports and FIDH of 92 and 93 at Verschave trial on 6 March 2001, 'Noir Procès', by FXVerschave.	
1991-1992	Lake Chad: massacres of the Lake Chad Buduma people and the Kanembus of Kanem by the presidential guard during the war against the Movement for Democracy and Development (MDD)	N Yorongar March 2009 yorongar.com	
1991 - October	Guéra (+ Ndjamena) massacres after alleged coup d'état of 13 October 1991 and pullback of those loyal to Maldom Abbas (MPS) (Colonels Kaffine and Garboubou)	'Noir silence', Verschave, pp. 154-171. 21 October 91, Maldom Abbas and support amnesty.org	hundreds of soldiers and civilians massacred (Verschave) at least 40 deaths (Amnesty)
1992 - February	N'Djamena: a massacre after 21 February clashes with CSNPD	Amnesty: The nightmare continues, April 93, amnesty.org	38 bodies + ... (Amnesty)
1992 - February-July	220 Chadians, real or supposed members of the Movement for Democracy and Development (MDD) kidnapped in Nigeria, killed after torture led by Déby. MDD active in Lake Chad until 1995.	Amnesty, MDD, amnesty.org 'Noir Silence', Verschave, pp. 154-171.	220 killed according to Verschave, 3 killed 200 missing, (Amnesty)
1992 - full year (August)	Logone: Boudouloum and Goré: repression of populations under pretext of fighting against the rebellion of Colonel Moïse Kété of the CSNPD and Captain Laokin Bardé Frison. Massacres, rapes, burning of villages Logone Oriental, Doba, August 1992: Amnesty: 1 hundred massacred + 7...	'Noir Silence', Verschave, pp. 154-171. Amnesty: The Habré Legacy, October 2001 amnesty.org . Amnesty: The nightmare continues, April93, amnesty.org	One hundred killed in Doba (Amnesty) + ...
1993 - January February March	Lake Chad and the south (Logone Oriental) linked to the fight against Colonel Moïse Kété and CSNPD, according to Amnesty: arbitrary killings, "disappearances", burning down of granaries and houses in the Moyen-Chari prefecture and Logone Oriental. on or about 21 January 1993, at least 45 civilians killed by	Amnesty: The Habré Legacy, October 2001 amnesty.org (+ amnesty.org according to Chadian League for Human Rights (LTDH)) Amnesty according to 'Noir Silence', Verschave, p. 165	246 killed 22 villages burned looted in January (Amnesty quoted by Verschave), 45 civilians at Goré + 26 at Bebou (Amnesty+LTDH)

	Republican Guard in Goré. 26 dead at Bebou in March. Massacres while the CSNPD was in CAR.		
1993 - April	Logone: Kouhou Gore: Republican Guard linked with CSNPD continues to massacre. Kouh village 78 killed on the same day.	Amnesty calls for inquiry 21 April 93 amnesty.org Antoine Bangui at the Verschave trial 6 March 2001, 'Noir Procès—Black Silence', FXVerschave. (pressafrique.com)	(203 throats cut according to pa.com ?) 78 killed in Kouh (A. Bangui)
1993 - Summer	Ouaddaï: Gniguilim and Chokoyane: killing of civilians after fighting against the rebellion of Rally for Democracy and Liberty (RDL) of Captain Mahamat Nour Abdelkerim	Dobian Assingar, president of LTDH and Antoine Bangui at the Verschave trial March 6 2001, 'Noir Procès—Black Silence', Verschave.	80 killed (A. Bangui)
1993 - August 8	N'Djamena: demonstration repressed with rocket fire and automatic weapons (people from Gniguilim and Chokoyane)	'Noir silence', Verschave, pp. 154-171. (pressafrique.com . coll. RTI pro-Habré: juliette.abandokwe)	150-300 killed (Verschave)
1994 - January	Ouaddaï: Abéché massacres related to war against the National Front of Chad (FNT) of Dr. Bachar Harris	Yorongar with videotape at Verschave trial 6 March 2001, 'Noir procès', FXVerschave.	
1994 - August	Logone Occidental massacres during war against rebel Armed Forces of the Federal Republic (FARF) of Laoukein Bardé by Republican Guard: 30 killed, including 2 children.	Amnesty: The Habré Legacy, October 2001 amnesty.org Dobian Assingar President of LTDH Verschave trial, 6 March 2001, 'Noir Procès', FXVerschave.	30 killed in 1 massacre (Amnesty)
1994 - September	Logone (South): "72 hour punitive expedition and scorched earth policy" (FARF)	'Noir silence', Verschave, p165. LTDH: pressafrique.com	
1995 - February	Logone Oriental: Goré (FARF)	Commission of Inquiry, quoted by pressafrique.com	247 killed
1995	Ouaddaï linked to the war against the National Front of Chad (FNT) of Dr. Bachar Harris	Antoine Bangui at the Verschave trial, 6 March 2001 : Noir Procès, Verschave.	
1995	Logone Occidental: massacres at Moundou and 35 kilometers from Moundou (FARF)	Yorongar at the Verschave trial, 6 March 2001, Noir Procès, FXVerschave.	
1997 - Oct.	Logone Occidental Moundou (+ Goré): massacre of the FARF during their coordination rally at Moundou (30 October 1997 in the presence of French soldiers) (Verschave)	Amnesty: The Habré Legacy, October 2001 amnesty.org . p165 of Noir silence, Verschave Dobian Assingar LTDH Verschave trial 6 March 2001, 'Noir Procès', Verschave. Reuters, 1 October 1997 according to pressafrique.com	Mass graves, over 150 killed most of them civilians according to Assingar. 80 according to Amnesty.

nov97- march98	South and 2 Logone (and Moyen-Chari) FARF: ethnic massacres. Déby physically present at the 2 Logones according to FXVerschave. Collective of human rights associations signed Benam Manadiyam 58 killed (provisional assessment). March 1998 torture and murder of hundreds of people. 97-98: burned villages. March 11, 1998: assassination of about fifteen heads of villages.	FXVerschave, M.-H. Aubert, MP (according to the archives of the Parliamentary Information Mission (France) on Oil of 1998) Dobian Assingar LTDH, André Barthélémy, Issa Karam Ibrahim, Antoine Bangui at the Verschave trial 6 March 2001 'Noir Procès', FXVerschave.	FXV trial: 58 + hundreds killed in March 1998 (Aubert), over 500 killed in 97-98 (Assingar). 15 leaders killed (Bartholomew)
1998 - February	South: Sarh massacres after kidnapping of 4 French doctors by Doctor Mahamout Nahor (People's Democratic Front (FDP)) on February 10, 1998 on orders of Déby according to Captain IKIbrahim. Massacres with French soldiers nearby.	'Noir silence', Verschave p. 167. Issa Karam Ibrahim at Verschave trial 6 March 2001, 'Noir Procès', FXVerschave. Noir Chirac, Verschave, p. 230 quoting Thomas Sotinel, Le Monde, 23 May 1998	57 killed (Verschave), 200-300 killed according to IKIbrahim
1999	Ouaddaï: Abéché: massacres linked to the war against the National Front of Chad (FNT) of Doctor Bachar Harris	Antoine Bangui at Verschave trial 6 March 2001, Noir Procès, FXVerschave.	240 killed (ABangui)
2000	Tibesti: war against Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT) of Yusuf Togoïmi: massacre of 25 rebels arrested with Togoïmi (April 2000) + 9 prisoners in late 2000	USA 2000 Report: state.gov USA 2001 Report: state.gov	25 + 4 + 9 killed according to U.S. in 2000
1 July 2002	<i>NB: Entry into force Rome Statute creating the ICC, with jurisdiction over crimes committed after 1 July 2002.</i>		
2003-2009	<i>Sudan responsibility of Déby in war in Darfur, during crossover rebellions between Sudan and Chad.</i>	<i>The UN report on al-Bashir for the ICC of 2 September 2008 makes no allusion to Déby.</i>	
2006: April 12-14 (+ December)	Ndjamena: battle against the United Front for Change (FUC) of Mahamat Nour armed by Sudan, "14 soldiers disappear along with civilians suspected of having participated in the attack"	Amnesty September 2009: Enforced disappearances in Chad amnesty.fr	14 soldiers and some civilians disappear.
2006 - April	<i>Sudan border (+ Ndjamena): French Mirage bombing of civilians in Adré and Moudeïna during fight against the United Front for Democratic Change of Mahamat Nour (FUC) April 12-14: FUC attacks Ndjamena. December: fighting before peace treaty.</i>	<i>13 April 2006 AFP sanganet.com 'Que fait l'armée française en Afrique--What Does the French Do in Africa?', Raphael Granvaud (Survie, 2009), p. 307</i>	<i>(Civilians killed by French bombing)</i>
2006(Dec05) - 2008 (2010)	East: prisoners of war executed during war with the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD)	coll. RTI pro-Habré: juliette.abandokwe	

2008- February 2 & 3	N'Djamena: battle against rebels from the East: unified military command UFDD of General Mahamat Nouri, UFDD-Fundamental of Abdelwahid About Mackaye and Rally of Forces for Change (RFC) of Tom Erdimi. According to the Commission of Inquiry 5 August 2008 977 people including civilians, ANT, and rebels killed, 1758 wounded, 34 raped, and 380 prisoners. Machine guns, helicopters bombs killed many civilians on the outskirts of N'Djamena : Abena, Blabline, Chaguoua, Diguel. Murder of suspects. Amnesty October 2013: "hundreds of people were killed, others arrested, and some subjected to enforced disappearances ", of whom Ibni Oumar Saleh.	U.S. report state.gov What is the French army doing in Africa, Raphael Granvaud (Survie, 2009), pp; 308-322 Amnesty October 2013: "In the Name of Security"	(Officially 977 killed: civilians + military + rebels according to Commission of Inquiry) + enforced disappearances according to amnesty
(2008-2009)	<i>(East: war against rebels: Front for Salvation of the Republic (FSR), Union of Forces for Democracy and Development and Renewed Development (UFDDR-R), National Movement for Recovery (MNR), National Movement and the Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT), Union for Strength and Resistance (UFR): clashes in Goz Beida June 13, 2008, in Am Dam June 15, 2009, and Goz Beida and Koukou Angarana 6 and 7 May 2009)</i>	<i>(Report of the United Nations Mission in CAR and Chad (MINURCAT: no massacre indicated)</i>	
2008 - February	Central African Republic: according to Human Rights Watch, civilians killed, villages burned, including several villages burned on 29 February 2008 around Maitoukoulou.	U.S. Report according to HRW: state.gov	Civilians killed, villages burned
2008 - 29 June	Moyen Chari - Kouno: Repression of Ahmet Ismael Bichara's Islamists.	U.S. report state.gov + rfi.fr	68 killed (+four gendarmes)

B. 1980-1990: Massacres during the Presidency of Hissène Habré in which Déby was involved

1980 - Dec. 15	N'Djamena: Déby then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the North killed 25 Libyan prisoners of war at Habré's house.	Koti Yacoub Hisseine at Verschave trial 6 March 2001, 'Noir Procès', FXVerschave.	25 killed by Déby
1982-1989	Déby, Chief of Staff of Armed Forces of the North (FAN) and then of the Chadian National Armed Forces (Forces Armées Nationales Tchadiennes or FANT) from 1983 to 1985 (Chief of Staff for the National Army of Chad), Special consultant for defense and security 1987-1988	Mahmat Hassan Akbar 7 September 2013, Chad Idriss Déby trial, Witness against: <u>Ngarlejy Yorongar</u> HRW 3 December 20 report on Habré	40,000 killed under Habré (according to Commission of Inquiry)
1983-1985	N'Djamena: Hadjérai massacres of Guéra: sub prefectures of Mongo, Mangalmé, Bitkine and Melfi (Guéra) Aboudeia, Haraz-Manguagne and Amtiman (Salamat), Ati, Djédah, Oumhadjer (Batha) Ouaddaï prefecture, Chari-Baguirmi,...	<u>Ngarlejy Yorongar</u>	
1984 - September	<p>"Black September" against Codos: Déby commander in chief, of the FANT. Massacre of southern populations (Christian or animists known as the "Kirdi"), of Sarh at Moundou (e.g. Kélo and Lai), and passing through many villages.</p> <p>Logone Occidental: Deli 27 Sept. 1984: at least 80 fighters who laid down their arms were extra judicially executed by government troops + 21 employees of state farm executed, according to Amnesty.</p> <p>Sarh: fifty political leaders or community leaders, many from Sarh executed or disappeared.</p> <p>Moyen-Chari: N'Galo: according to Amnesty: killings + church burned down with refugees + Danamadji + Bedaya.</p>	<p>Amnesty: The Habré Legacy, October 2001 amnesty.org .</p> <p>Yorongar and KYHisseine at Verschave trial 6 March 2001 "Noir Procès—Black Trial", FXVerschave. Site <u>Ngarlejy Yorongar</u>. Kebzabo and Yorongar witnesses tchadenligne.com HRW 3 December 2013 : report on Habré : p. 280 then p. 293 à (primarily according to the archives of the DDS)</p>	Massacres at Moundou 500 killed + hundreds of southern leaders according to Yorongar - 50 according to Amnesty. Deli: 100 killed on 27th according to Amnesty. HRW : hundreds (p. 280) + ...
1986 + June-July 1987 + Dec. 1988	Guéra: Mongo and Bitkine: counterinsurgency repression of MOSANAT: prisoners killed. Burned alive.	Amnesty: The Habré Legacy, October 2001 amnesty.org .	

In 2009, Amnesty recalled that **enforced disappearances are a "recurring practice"** which "continues to be a method used by the Chadian security forces to spread terror among the population and to intimidate real or perceived political opponents. This was the case in April 2006 when armed opposition groups attacked the capital N'Djamena. During the clashes, 14 soldiers and civilians suspected of having

participated in the attack, were arrested and have disappeared.”⁹ The organization drew particular attention to the disappearance of Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh. In its latest report, “In the name of security?” dated 24 October 2013, Amnesty writes of the increasing number of enforced disappearances which “constitute crimes under international law, are subject to universal jurisdiction and may, in some cases, amount to **crimes against humanity, including under the Rome Statute.**”¹⁰

Some of the crimes are crimes against humanity therefore not subject to a statute of limitations. **To avoid prosecution by the ICC** for crimes committed since July 2002, as was Sudan’s President al-Bashir in 2008, Idriss Déby has adapted himself. On 1 November 2006, Chad ratified the Rome Statute.¹¹

In 1990, the National Commission of Inquiry set at 40,000 the number of victims of Habré’s regime. **As early as 1993, Amnesty warned about the continuity of methods between the two regimes.**¹² **Habré’s trial, delayed for several years, will be held in Dakar African Chambers** over 27 months from mid-2013: “15 months for legal proceedings, seven months for the trial and five months for the appeal proceedings.”¹³ Habré’s trial carries within it a fundamental issue in the **construction of law in Africa**, in its relationship with international justice. Will the trial highlight the role played by France and the U.S. in training and financing the Chadian Documentation and Security Directorate (DDS)? The trial starts in a context where the International Criminal Court is under attack by a number of African presidents, some of whom are recognized as dictators. Each element of impunity will have a historical impact. Idriss Déby is said to have been granted “immunity” during the Habré trial in the African Chambers in Senegal, where he is expected to testify as a witness.¹⁴ What options for investigation exist outside the framework fixed by the current Chadian dictatorship? Will witnesses who have knowledge of both periods be directed to speak only of the 80s? There are mass graves from the Habré period and others from the Déby period.

Commander in Chief of the Northern Armed Forces (FAN), Chief of Staff for the National Armed Forces of Chad (FANT) from 1983 to 1985, and then Special Adviser for defense and security from 1987 to 1988, **Déby led some of the massacres attributed to Habré, including those in 1984 in the South known as “Black September”**, and those in the region of Guéra in the repression of MOSANAT between 1986 and 1988. Reed Brody of Human Rights Watch, who, for years, has been very much involved in the Habré trial, said on October 24, 2013: “Idriss Déby is implicated in the case. He was Commander in Chief of the Chadian army during a particularly deadly time commonly known as “Black September”. For this, he must explain himself. The part he played must be examined. I’m not saying if he committed crimes or not. But I think the fact that he was commander in chief and was often in the south, physically in 1984 and 1985, must oblige him to explain these facts. Now, we cannot put on the same footing Idriss Déby, the person who was following orders, on one hand, and the supreme leader Hissène Habré on the other ... One of the reasons for this trial is to issue a warning to Idriss Déby and to tell those who are in power now that there are lines you cannot cross, your predecessor is being judged for having crossed those lines. You too, woe betide you if you cross those lines! There are several reasons why this trial is going to prove difficult for Idriss Déby.”¹⁵

⁹ September 2009 Amnesty: ‘Disparitions forcées au Tchad - Enforced Disappearances in Chad’ : http://www.amnesty.fr/sites/default/files/SF09MA084_tchad.pdf

¹⁰ <http://www.amnesty.org/fr/library/asset/AFR20/007/2013/fr/1a12f728-84c5-4c58-ab83-830224ebcb47/afr200072013fr.pdf>

¹¹ 7 November 2006, ‘Le Tchad devient le 104e État partie au Statut de Rome - Chad becomes the 104th State Party to the International Criminal Court Treaty [icc-cpi.int](http://www.icc-cpi.int)

¹² 21 April 1993, ‘Amnesty International demande l’ouverture d’une enquête exhaustive sur les massacres perpétrés par l’armée dans le Sud en 1993 - Amnesty International calls for a thorough investigation into the killings by the army in the South’

<http://amnesty.org/fr/library/asset/AFR20/016/1993/fr/1c186fb7-f90c-11dd-92e7-c59f81373cf2/afr200161993fr.pdf>

. April 1993 ‘Le cauchemar continue - The nightmare continues:

<http://amnesty.org/fr/library/asset/AFR20/005/1993/fr/34bb3da2-ecd8-11dd-a08b-b3b1782331b8/afr200051993fr.html>

¹³ 2 July 2013 ‘Affaire Habré : Un budget de 4.695.907.261 Fcfa prévu pour une procédure de 27 mois - The Habré Affair: A budget of 4,695,907,261 CFA Francs estimated for a 27-month trial’, http://www.seneweb.com/news/Justice/affaire-habre-un-budget-de-4-695-907-261-fcfa-prevu-pour-une-procedure-de-27-mois_n_99407.html

¹⁴ 30 September 2013: ‘Jean Bernard Padaré : l’avocat qui construit scientifiquement la perte d’Idriss Deby ITNO - Jean Bernard Padaré: the lawyer who is scientifically building the fall of Idriss Deby ITNO <http://www.ndjamena-matin.com/article-tchad-jean-bernard-padare-l-avocat-qui-construit-scientifiquement-la-perte-d-idriss-deby-itno-120325040.html>

¹⁵ Enquête Plus ‘Entretien avec Reed Brody - An interview with Reed Brody’, <http://www.enqueteplus.com/content/entretien-avec-reed-brody-porte-parole-%C3%A0-human-rights-watch-%C2%ABles-avocats-de-habre%C3%A9-font-comme>

Has not Déby already crossed the line? And, if so, which line? Is it a line he crossed after an implicit amnesty? The position taken by Human Rights Watch, or at least that of Reed Brody, is it not in itself political?

3. The Stable President in an Unstable Region

Idriss Déby, in the relatively stable Françafrique framework that has existed since the ‘independences’ has intervened in non-border countries: Togo in 1993 or Congo - Brazzaville in 1999 to support Sassou Nguesso¹⁶. Before intervening in Mali in 2013, he focused on the neighboring countries of Libya, Sudan, Cameroon and Nigeria. **In Sudan, the Central African Republic and in Mali, Idriss Déby** has become recognized as a military strategist.

Chad is implicated in the **destabilization of the region**. The blurred boundary between the Chadian army and the mercenaries (due to frequent comings and goings between rebellions and the military) has allowed Déby to conceal the role he is playing. One goal is to avoid the formation of rebellions. Supported inside Chad by the French since 1986, Idriss Déby has accumulated the experience that allows him to strengthen himself militarily outside. This is what he has done again in 2013 in Mali and the Central African Republic.

3.1 Sudan: 2004-2009

Al-Bashir supported Déby in 1990 when he took power. He supported him in 2000 against Youssouf Togoïmi’s Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT) which could have overcome Déby if al-Bashir had not intervened. **The relationship deteriorated from May 2004** after the mutiny or failed coup d’Etat mounted by Zaghawa opposition to Déby which failed: the rebels who left the Chadian army regrouped in Sudan around Yaya Dillo creating the Platform for Change, National Unity and Democracy (SCUD),¹⁷. Bashir being ambiguous about this, Daoussa Déby, Idriss Déby’s older brother, raised and strengthened the rebel Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) opposed to al-Bashir. The formation of the **United Front for Change (FUC)** by Mahamat Nour in 2004 was supported by al-Bashir, who suspected that Déby was behind the JEM.

The FUC attacked N’Djamena in April 2006. **The three columns of rebels which reached N’Djamena in 1990, 2006 and 2008 all left from the Sudanese border**. According to the reporter, René-Jacques Lique, in 2006, the United Front for Change (FUC) “managed to get that far because of Déby himself who, by aiding and supporting rebel movements in a Darfur at war against the regime in Khartoum, pushed Sudan to take counter measures. Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, in turn, found it a pleasure to arm and equip Mahamat Nour’s FUC to destabilize the Chadian regime.”

The to-ing and fro-ing of rebellions between Chad and Sudan, or the cross-system of alliances between Sudan and Chad, lasted from 2004 to 2009. Idriss Déby has a share of responsibility for the conflict in Darfur which resulted in 300,000 victims according to the UN.¹⁸ In the opinion of the geographer Geraud Magrin, “Sudan accused Chad of supporting the rebellion in the name of solidarity within the Zaghawa group, to which Idriss Déby belongs. In return, Sudan began to support Chadian rebellions (see Debos, 2007)”.¹⁹ However, between 2006 and 2009, the relationship between Chad and Sudan was marked by **disagreements between Idriss Déby and his brothers Daoussa Déby and Timan Déby**, the ‘Sultan of

¹⁶ Perhaps also in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in support to Joseph Kabila (no source). Source Congo-Brazzaville from January to August 1999 ‘Noir Procès--Black Trial’, FX Verschave, May 2001: Verschave against Nguesso and Bongo Déby 28 February 2001

¹⁷ 22 October 2005, RFI: ‘Rivalités zaghawa - Zaghawa Rivalries: http://www.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/070/article_39329.asp

¹⁸ 31 December 2008, Darfur: UNAMID, one year old and 12,374 soldiers deployed:

<http://www.un.org/apps/newsFr/storyF.asp?NewsID=18100&Cr=Darfour&Cr1=Soudan>

¹⁹ Geraud Magrin 2008, Chad 2008: Geography of an ordinary war, <http://echogeo.revues.org/2249>

Sultans.²⁰ Daoussa Déby and other members of the Zaghawa supported the JEM and Khalil Ibrahim without Idriss Déby doing so himself, and in 2008 Daoussa Déby pushed the JEM to support Idriss Déby in February 2008 during the attack by the UFDD (and RFC UFCD and Fundamental UFDD) that came from Sudan. By reconciling himself with Sudan, Idriss Déby has gradually gained the upper hand in influence over the JEM.²¹

Hundreds of thousands of Sudanese refugees came to camps in Chad. According to Oxfam in 2008, “refugees recruited by armed groups participated both in the defense of N’Djamena, when the rebels attacked in February, and in the attack on Khartoum in May 2008,” and “Darfur rebels forcibly recruited 4,700 adults and children from the camps of Bredjing and Treguine, presumably with the complicity of Chad.”²²

Peace between Déby and Bashir was obtained thanks to French diplomacy and Gaddafi. After the 2007 meeting between **Sarkozy and Gaddafi, Gaddafi put effort into supporting Déby and peace between Chad and Sudan.**²³ Al-Bashir controlled the threat to Chad by supporting Mahamat Nouri’s UFDD, and the Rally of Forces for Change (RFC) which reached N’Djamena on February 2 and 3, 2008. The JEM is thought to have intervened to help Déby with support from Gaddafi in a manner that remains to be clarified.²⁴ During the 2008-2009 EUFOR period, Gaddafi worked to rally troops, to get them to return to Ndjamena, and to dismantle rebellions. After 2009, the politico-military organizations switched to standby.

When al-Bashir was prosecuted by the **International Criminal Court during the war in Darfur**, it was not obvious, a priori, that Déby would not also be prosecuted. Déby was better ‘positioned diplomatically. Déby collaborated with the ICC in compiling the file on al-Bashir, protected investigators in eastern Chad, provided the services of a lawyer who was later promoted to senior civil service rank, and by collaborating with the International Republican Institute (IRI) (iri.org, USA). The UN report which served to incriminate Bashir before the ICC²⁵ does not include any question of Déby’s liability. Subsequently, the Chadian Head of State has betrayed the ICC and sparked outrage by twice welcoming al-Bashir.

3.2 Libya: 2011

According to International Crisis Group,²⁶ “From 1990 to 2005, Gaddafi, along with President Idriss Déby followed a policy of normalization characterized by intensification of bilateral cooperation and Libya’s contribution to the **pacification of northern Chad**. From 2005, following the deterioration of the situation in eastern Chad, he set himself up as a mediator and a guarantor of the balance of power between Chad and Sudan.” After the conflict with Sudan, Déby owed a debt to Gaddafi.

It was inevitable that the abandon by Western forces of the Colonel **and the NATO attack on 19 March 2011** would seriously disrupt the relationship between the Chadian and Libyan dictators. In an interview with Jeune Afrique, the Chadian president has said, about the military intervention, the “hasty decision

21 October 2011 International Crisis Group: Africa without Gaddafi: The Case of Chad, p. 18

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/central-africa/chad/180%20L'Afrique%20sans%20Kadhafi%20-%20le%20cas%20du%20Tchad.pdf>

²⁰ 21.10.11, International Crisis Group : L’afrique sans Kadhafi : le cas du Tchad—Africa without Gaddafi, the case of Chad,’ p. 18:

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/central-africa/chad/180%20L'Afrique%20sans%20Kadhafi%20-%20le%20cas%20du%20Tchad.pdf>

²¹ This alliance would later break up. See also: 15 November 2011, ‘Zooming into the power struggles... within the Déby Itno clan:

http://www.zoomtchad.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=233&catid=1&Itemid=2

+ Sudan: the struggle between the Sultan Idriss Déby and his fallen brother Timan Deby, by way of rebellions in Darfur

<http://tchadpages.com/2013/05/16/soudan-la-lutte-entre-le-sultan-idriss-deby-et-le-sultan-dechu-timan-deby-par-rebellions-du-darfour-interposees/>

²² 9 September 2008, OXFAM: Mission incomplete: why civilians remain at risk in eastern Chad,

http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp119_CHAD%20paper_FINAL_FRENCH_301008_.pdf

²³ 21 October 2011, International Crisis Group: Africa without Gaddafi: The Case of Chad, p6

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/central-africa/chad/180%20L'Afrique%20sans%20Kadhafi%20-%20le%20cas%20du%20Tchad.pdf>

²⁴ Hypothesis about transport via Libyan helicopters, by Nicolas Beau, “Papa Holland in Mali: Chronicle of a coming fiasco” 2013.

²⁵ 2 September 2008, UN: “Human rights situations that require the Council’s attention: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Sudan: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G08/153/54/PDF/G0815354.pdf?OpenElement>

²⁶ Ibid, p. 5, 21 October 2011, International Crisis Group: Africa without Gaddafi: The Case of Chad

could have serious consequences in terms of regional destabilization and the dissemination of terrorism to Europe and the Mediterranean and in Africa.”²⁷

Two weeks after the 19 March 2011 NATO attack Gaddafi asked Déby for help. As of 8 April, the Libyan Transitional National Council denounced the presence of **3,000 Chadian Republican Guard soldiers**, naming its generals.²⁸ Few Western media, apart from Le Figaro and The Telegraph, published this information.²⁹ According to another source, 400 soldiers left Bardei in the Tibesti and this was followed by 1,000 soldiers who went to Benghazi. Many of these Chadians, in the armored brigade led by Gaddafi’s son Khamis, reportedly died in Benghazi during the first bombardments.

In quick order, and following a well established method, **confusion was sown when the soldiers were described as Chadian mercenaries recruited by Gaddafi**. On 25 March, it was Déby himself, in an interview with Jeune Afrique, who showed the vocabulary to use: “There has been no process, either official or unofficial, for the recruitment of mercenaries for Libya. However, several hundred thousand Chadians live in Libya, some of them have been there for a long time, and have settled down in the country. It is therefore possible that a handful of them have, in one way or another, participated in the fighting on a personal basis.”³⁰ In its report the International Crisis Group (ICG) demonstrates the defense strategy of the Chadian regime:³¹ “According to N’Djamena, these fighters, among whom Chadians are far from being a majority, don’t belong to the presidential guard because they were recruited either in Libya or in neighboring countries through intermediaries working for pro-Gaddafi forces. The Chadian authorities have denied coordinating recruitment with these intermediaries, who would have acted in Chad without their knowledge.” The surviving soldiers and/or mercenaries and the Chadian recruiters subsequently became inconvenient witnesses, persona non grata in Chad, and they melted away.

ICG analyzed **the Chadian position in 2011 as being one of equilibrium**³² “The eight months of war that led to the fall of Colonel Gaddafi must have been very long for Idriss Déby, whose initial strategy was to not abandon his northern partner while avoiding the political costs of such an approach.” Following the line of the African Union, he was finally able to highlight the flaws in NATO strategy,³³ “I believe that history will prove me right. It is no secret that considerable stocks of weapons from the Libyan arsenals are circulating in the Sahel-Saharan region and along the thousand kilometers of our shared border... Who benefits from this huge marketplace? The terrorists of AQMI and Boko Haram, the rebellions in Darfur and elsewhere... the brutal manner in which he was overturned could not fail to generate unrest in a country without institutions or a Constitution.” This analysis at the end of 2011 allowed Déby to prepare for the conflict in Mali in early 2013.

After its victory, the **National Transitional Council of Libya remained hostile to Déby**, accusing him of having kept a share of Gaddafi’s treasure which Gaddafi, when cornered and seeing no solution, allegedly

²⁷ 25 March 2011, AFP: The Chadian Deby says AQMI has seized missiles in Libya
<http://www.jeuneafrique.com/actu/20110325T135147Z20110325T135145Z/>

²⁸ “The president of Chad sent three thousand presidential guards to assist Gaddafi, and they fought in Az-Zawiya, Misurata, Ras Lanuf and Burayqah under the command of: 1.General Abbadi Sair. 2. General Touffa Abdoullaye.3.General Ramadan Erdebou. 4. General Ousmane Mahamat Bahar Itno.5. Colonel Bakhit Bahar Mahamat Itno,” ‘Statement of the National Transitional Council on the support of the Chadian government to Gaddafi’s regime’, Benghazi, 8 April 2011, <http://www.libyanmission-un.org/ntc%20ENG/ntc1.pdf>

²⁹ *Tchadactuel* picked up by Le Figaro: <http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2011/02/23/01003-20110223ARTFIG00747-la-garde-tchadienne-au-secours-du-colonel-kadhafi.php>, and according to ICG *ibid* p.9, note 35: “Libya protests: foreign mercenaries using heavy weapons against demonstrators”, The Telegraph, 20 February 2011 and “Libya: an uncertain future.Report of the evaluation mission to Libyan belligerents”, International Center for Research on Terrorism - Helping Victims of Terrorism (AVT-CIRET), Paris, May 2011

³⁰ 25 March 2011, AFP: Chad’s Deby says AMI has seized missiles in Libya
<http://www.jeuneafrique.com/actu/20110325T135147Z20110325T135145Z/>

³¹ *ibid*, p.11, 21 October 2011, International Crisis Group: ‘Africa without Gaddafi: The Case of Chad’

³² *ibid*, p. 8, 21 October 2011, International Crisis Group: ‘Africa without Gaddafi: The Case of Chad’

³³ 26 December 2011, Idriss Deby: “In Libya, history will prove me right” <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAJA2658p026-030.xml0/>

sent by truck to Chad.³⁴ Faced with this tension, Déby feared a new Chadian rebellion coming from Libya; the Toubou people are spread over Chad, Libya and Niger. The rebellion of the National Movement and the Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT) lost its leader Youssouf Tougoumi in 2002, but the MDJT still exists in the south of Libya, led by Yaya Hissein Barka.

3.3 Nigeria: 2009-2013

Investigations need to be conducted sensitively into the relationship between Chad and Nigeria and the North of Cameroon where Boko Haram is installed. In February 2013, Jeune Afrique cited a “diplomatic source” and “unconfirmed and not easily verifiable information” about “500 members of Boko Haram, the Nigerian Islamist sect (who) had managed to infiltrate N’Djamena”.³⁵ Every year, Chadian families send children to Boko Haram’s Koranic schools.³⁶ In late November 2013, the presence of Boko Haram in Chad was also evoked in the context of the Central African Republic: “The potential for destabilization is also regional, since it involves Chadian and Sudanese rebels and the Nigerian Islamist sect Boko Haram is now extending its tentacles into Cameroon and Chad, neighbors of the Central African Republic.”³⁷

The borders of Chad, Nigeria, Cameroon and Niger intersect at Lake Chad, which is currently very dry and reduced to a small fraction of its original surface. Searches for the French family kidnapped in the North of Cameroon on 19 February 2013 were undertaken in the islands, canals, and wetlands.³⁸ According to the U.S. Army’s website ‘Combating Terrorism Center’, “**Boko Haram takes advantage of Niger, Chad and Cameroon to find refuge, to train, make transit, plan attacks and recruit.**”³⁹

Given the “profession of arms” widely present in Chad, a part of the attacking forces of Boko Haram are Chadian. When fighting takes place against the Nigerian state, as in 2009 and 2010, the Chadians flee to northern Cameroon, and Lake Chad. The region is full of weapons coming from Libya, Sudan, Uganda, and the biggest arms market is in a village in northern Cameroon. In early 2012, **two Chadian ministers, one of them a nephew of Idriss Déby**, were accused by a Chadian living in Nigeria of financing Boko Haram. He related this when telling of a massacre committed by the Nigerian military police.⁴⁰ This merits an investigation which takes into account the climate of repression, corruption and impunity.

3.4 Central African Republic: 2012-2013

Déby installed Bozizé in place of Patassé in March 2003 with the consent of the French President.⁴¹ The Chadians referred to themselves as “liberators”. Chad remained influential in supporting Bozizé against several rebellions. In February 2008, Chadian soldiers were present in Central Africa, where according to Human Rights Watch, cited by the U.S. government, “they killed civilians and burned villages”.⁴² Bozizé began to make ties with South Africa, gradually excluding Chad. Most importantly, the **situation** became increasingly **uneasy in 2012 during negotiations between Bozizé and political opponents and rebels about the peace agreements made in 2011.** Chadian soldiers were providing protection to Bozizé.

³⁴ 22 September 2011, “The cynical play acting of Déby is not taking in the NCT: <http://www.ndjamena-matin.com/article-le-cynique-cinema-de-deby-ne-trompe-pas-le-cnt-84922069.html>, see also the property of Gaddafi in South Africa or being sought for in the Sahara.

³⁵ 13 February 2013, Chad: the Boko Haram threat: <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/JA2718p008-009.xml5/>

³⁶ 1 March 2012, Hundreds of Chadian migrant children flee Nigeria 13 October 2012, Nigeria-Chad: Migrant children reunited with their families: <http://www.irinnews.org/fr/report/96560/nigeria-tchad-les-enfants-migrants-retrouvent-leur-famille>

³⁷ 27 November 2013, ‘Central African Republic: Paris ready to intervene militarily in a few days’ <http://rpdefense.over-blog.com/2013/11/centrafrique-paris-pr%C3%AAt-%C3%A0-intervenir-militairement-dans-quelques-jours.html>

³⁸ 3 March 2013, “The hunt for members of Boko Haram centered on Lake Chad http://www.francetvinfo.fr/monde/cameroun/otages-francais/video-la-traque-des-membres-de-boko-haram-cible-le-lac-tchad_273347.html

³⁹ 14 January 2013, Boko Haram’s International Connections: <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/boko-harams-international-connections>

⁴⁰ 3 March 2012, Massacre of Chadians in Nigeria, the financial link of two Chadian ministers with Boko Haram: <http://tchadonline.com/index.php/massacre-de-tchadiens-au-nigeria-le-lien-financier-de-deux-ministres-tchadiens-avec-boko-haram/>

⁴¹ Survie: CAR: Exit Patassé: <http://survie.org/billets-d-afrique/2003/113-avril-2003/article/centrafrique-exit-patasse>

⁴² 25 February 2009, U.S. Government: 2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/af/118993.htm>

Following criticism made by Bozizé about rape in Bangui, Bozizé asked Déby to control his soldiers, and Déby withdrew his protection in October 2012. According to RFI, “When the Seleka launched its first attack on Bangui in December, the Chadian military intervened. This was exercise of “the precautionary principle”: N’Djamena suspected Michel Djotodia of maintaining good relations with the Chadian rebellion.”⁴³ After he’d done what he thought needed to be done, Déby totally abandoned Bozizé.

Michel Djotodia used to be the Central African consul in South Sudan, close to Captain Mahamat Nour Abdelkerim of the FUC, who, after signing a peace treaty with Déby in 2006 was appointed Minister of Defense of the Chadian government in March 2007 (then sacked 1 December 2007 in the wake of renewed fighting). **Déby is said to have met, one after the other, with Djotodia** of the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR) and the Central African rebel leaders, Adam Nouredine (PJCC in exile in Dubai), Mohamed Moussa Dhaffane of the Wa Kodro Salute Patriotic Convention (CPSK), and Abdoulaye Miskine, of the Democratic Front for the Central African People (FDPC) (a former ally of Patassé): four of the main elements of the future Seleka.⁴⁴

According to Jeune Afrique,⁴⁵ “When Charles Massi, the political leader of the PJCC, died in December 2009, **Nouredine Adam** took over as head of the movement. After denouncing, in June, the agreement that one of his companions, Abdoulaye Hissène, had just signed with Bangui, he decided, on 20 August 2012, to join forces with Mohamed Moussa Dhaffane’s Wa Kodro Salute Patriotic Convention (CPSK). The two men managed to convince Michel Djotodia and the UFDR join them. It was the birth of the Seleka.” And⁴⁶ “For three years (2010-2012), Nouredine Adam spent most of his time between the bush and Chad where he enjoyed mixed fortunes, at one time arrested for alleged connivance with the rebels fighting against Idriss Déby Itno, then being supported to the point where he could soon pass for “**the man of N’Djamena**”. Mid 2012, Déby released Nouredine Adam and Mohamed Moussa Dhaffane (CPSK) who had been imprisoned in Chad.⁴⁷

Many Chadian mercenaries easily move from one rebellion to another. The rebellions which have continued in Sudan since 2009 have less of a future. **A large number of the Seleka mercenaries were recruited from Chadian rebellions in Sudan,**⁴⁸ in particular the technical specialists who handle heavy weapons are Chadians from Sudan, former FUC, UFR (and UFDD).⁴⁹ According to the researcher Roland Marchal⁵⁰, «Idriss Déby was aware that among the members of the Seleka were numerous Chadian fighters, who had served under the command of Mahamat Nouri, Adouma Hassaballah and Adoum Yacoub Koukou and, for the most part, belonged to Ouaddaian groups. Furthermore, because they anticipated a Seleka victory, many Chadian opponents from countries all over the region are agitating and talking about resuming armed combat, this time using the Central African Republic as a sanctuary.” It is very difficult to grasp the relationship, the level of agreement that exists between these mercenaries, the officers present in the Central African Republic, and the leaders of the rebellions. For example, Captain Moussa Ismail, of Ahmat Hassaballah Soubiane’s Front for the Salvation of the Republic (FSR), went to CAR (where he finally stayed without troops) and the FSR congratulated the Seleka in March 2013.⁵¹ The journalist Vincent Munié indicated the presence in CAR of “the Chadian rebels of Colonel Moussa Aboud Mackaye (UFDD-

⁴³ 26 March 2013, Central African Republic: Bozizé dropped by Deby ignored by Hollande <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130326-centrafrique-bozize-lache-deby-lache-hollande>

⁴⁴ http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seleka_%28R%C3%29%20publique_centrafricaine

⁴⁵ 4 April 2013, Central African Republic: Adam Nouredine, the other strong man in Bangui: <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20130403123503/>

⁴⁶ 26 April 2013, Central African Republic: Adam Nouredine, the makeshift General <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/JA2728p020.xml0/>

⁴⁷ 8 July 2012, The PJCC expresses support for the return of peace <http://www.radiodekeluka.org/securite/item/9897-la-cpip-se-dit-d%27accord-pour-la-signature-de-l%27accord-de-paix.html?tmpl=component&print=1>

⁴⁸ Up to 80-85% according to a Chadian source, ‘not the majority’, according to Roland Marchal on 9 October 2013, http://www.rtf.be/info/emissions/article_roland-marchal-est-l-invite-de-matin-premiere?id=8153285 taking into account that the number of mercenaries grew from 5,000 à 15,000.

⁴⁹ UFR: coalition mainly active in early 2009 formed by 8 rebellions UFDD, UFDD-F, FPRN, RFC ...: http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Union_des_forces_de_la_r%C3%A9sistance

⁵⁰ June 2013, Roland Marchal, Politique Africaine, p. 8 : <http://www.politique-africaine.com/numeros/pdf/conjonctures/130213.pdf>

⁵¹ 24 January 2012, Chad-CAR: FSR forces seen at Birao: <http://makaila.over-blog.com/article-tchad-rca-les-forces-du-fsr-aperçues-a-birao-97785125.html>, 25.3.13, Communiqué: the FSR congratulates the Seleka: <http://www.letchadanthropus-tribune.com/article-2037-860.html>

Fundamental), Sudanese Janjaweed who had escaped from the conflict in Darfur”.⁵² Many mercenaries are said to have come from Mahamat Nouri’s Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD), and Adoum Yacoub’s National Popular Resistance Front (FPRN). Moreover, as the Seleka is divided, it is difficult to know the importance of each leader.

Although a number of the mercenaries have made claims to be ‘jihadists’, propaganda has exaggerated this aspect which has grown into a rumor that the Seleka is the Trojan horse of the Sudanese Islamists”.⁵³ Churches, hospitals, schools and records of births have been looted⁵⁴, and clashes between Christians and Muslims have taken place, without it being possible to speak of a religious conflict, so great was the distance between the mercenaries and the populations. The situation has now become sufficiently confusing for the levels of violence to increase.

The formation of the Seleka would not have been possible without **funding**. Political logic suggests that Déby could have financed several components of the Seleka. There is no evidence to confirm either this hypothesis or accusation, Chad and the Central African Republic being countries in which investigations cannot be undertaken without risk. Witnesses have also spoken of **weapons transports and pickups coming from Ndjamena**, which would paradoxically have rendered service to mercenaries hitherto opposed to Déby, shortly before the attack of January 2013. The arrival of heavy weapons in the hands of the part of the Seleka closest to Déby, has also been evoked.

In March 2013, in the Multinational Force of the Central African States (FOMAC), the only real fighting troops were Chadian. On 23 and 24 March 2013, Chadian Special Forces covertly fought the CAR army and South African soldiers to open a breach for the Seleka that allowed them to enter Bangui. For Roland Marchal, “It was only after receiving strong assurances from the leaders of the Seleka (most notably the nominations of members of the Chadian security services to key positions in the Central African state apparatus (12: ‘Chad: Déby’s Enemies Crowd in’, Africa confidential, vol.54, n°11, 24 May 2013), and after rejecting the religious argument proffered by Bozizé (which said that the Seleka was the Trojan horse of the Sudanese Islamists) and assisting at the final attempts of the latter to hold onto power, that Idriss Déby **gave the green light to the attack on Bangui in March 2013**. Increased involvement of Chad in the regional force seems just as much a sign of power as an expression of weakness when faced with a movement like the Seleka, a number of whose commanders in the middle ranks obey the leadership only partially and are always ready to sell their services to whoever offers the most money.”

On 2 October, Jean-Christophe Belliard, the Director for Africa and the Indian Ocean in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated, ⁵⁵: “He (Déby) later realized that the Seleka had its own agenda and counted within its ranks elements opposed to the Chadian government.” According to Africa Confidential of 24 May 2013⁵⁶, “Initially, the Seleka leaders, Michel Am Nondokro Djotodia and the leader of the CPJP, “General” Noureddin Adam, promised Déby that they would prevent rebels of Chadian origin from challenging his authority. Déby felt that this guarantee was not enough and he managed to obtain the appointment of General Mahamat Bahar as the head of Central African Military Intelligence, the second bureau. He is said to have been for a long time the agent in Bangui of the Chadian intelligence service, the National Security Agency.” After the victory of the Seleka, Déby must have seen that the Seleka leaders were becoming increasingly independent and received confirmation of the links between the Seleka and Chadian leaders in the Sudan, among them the UFDD. The Seleka is then said to have gone, within a few weeks, **from 5,000 to 15,000 mercenaries**, the leaders closest to Chad recruiting quickly. Officially, the number of Chadian

⁵² 29 September 2013 Vincent Munié, Le Monde diplomatique, <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refdaily?pass=463ef21123&date=2013-09-30>

⁵³ June 2013, Roland Marchal, Politique Africaine, p. 8 : <http://www.politique-africaine.com/numeros/pdf/conjonctures/130213.pdf>

⁵⁴ Often ‘pseudo’ civil servants who speak neither of the official languages, Sango or French, have been installed.

⁵⁵ 2 October 2013, 2.10.13, Jean-Christophe Belliard, French Committee on Foreign Affairs: <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/cr-cafe/13-14/c1314002.asp>

⁵⁶ 24 May 2013, Africa Confidential, Deby's enemies crowd in: http://www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/4908/D%C3%A9by%20%E2%80%99s_enemies_crowd_in, French translation: <http://www.tchadactuel.com/?p=8995>, see also: 10.7.13, Juliette Abandokwe: The role of Seleka in the annexation of RCA by Chad <http://juliette.abandokwe.over-blog.com/article-le-role-de-seleka-dans-l-annexion-de-la-rca-par-le-tchad-119001776.html>, nomination 19 April 2013 <http://centrafrique-presse.over-blog.com/rca-les-nouvelles-autorit%C3%A9s-r%C3%A9organisent-le-commandement-des-faca>

soldiers in the FOMAC went from 500 to 800 and the Chadian government participated in the negotiations to transition the FOMAC into the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA). The double game continued.

After the French intervention began on 6 December 2013, Roland Marchal's reaction was,⁵⁷ « The Seleka found it very easy to recruit militias or mercenaries in Darfur and Chad and that therefore raises the question of what is happening in Darfur. A few years ago, it was the trending conflict that absolutely had to be talked about. These days, European politicians keep quiet. That also raises the question of Chad. A significant part but not the majority of the Seleka is made up of former Chadian rebels. Therefore, why, when the European Union intervened for over a year, spending 900 million euros for an operation, **why, finally, has there been no political agreement to solve this problem in Chad?** Why was it necessary to follow the French and save only the soldier Idriss Déby? These are real questions that need to be asked and which actually show that there is a regional dimension. The ambiguous or ambivalent attitude of Chad, which is to a certain extent the arsonist-firefighter in this crisis, must be analyzed.”

Following the seizure of power by the Seleka and Djotodia, the Central African population is now in great danger⁵⁸. On 15 December 2013, AFP stated⁵⁹: “Chadian soldiers who, in all logic, evacuated their nationals during the crisis, also ensure the security of Central African personalities such as the interim president (and former rebel leader) Michel Djotodia but also the Seleka senior leaders, who do not necessarily hold official positions. According to some French soldiers, speaking anonymously, Chadian soldiers gave their FOMAC (Multinational Force of Central Africa) armbands to Seleka fighters, thus allowing them to keep their weapons and to continue to operate. This mixture helps to make an already troubled situation even more confusing. “Chadian FOMAC soldiers are killing us. They are with the Seleka, not with the FOMAC,” is the accusation made by many Central Africans, in a country which is, by a very large majority, Christian.”

Déby has behaved as a firefighter-arsonist in the Central African Republic,⁶⁰ and the French gendarme who can see everything that happens in Chad and the CAR has not responded, because of a diplomatic quid pro quo with Chad for its support in Mali, or because it has secret interests. The French army and French diplomacy find justification in the official actions of the Chadian army, without highlighting the game of mercenaries which also hides the circulation of money. On his side, Déby can boast of avoiding the threat of rebellions against him in CAR.⁶¹ Mid-November 2013, the Chadian army entered Darfur with the consent of Sudan, to try to finish off the Union of Resistance Forces (UFR), the coalition that was active between January and May 2009, made up of 8 rebellions including the UFDD, UFDD-F, the FPRN, and the RFC, a coalition now divided and dispersed.

In Bangui in early December 2013, the population welcomed the arrival of the French army, but associates the 800 Chadian FOMAC soldiers with the Seleka.⁶² A large part of the population, and important people in civil society, are demanding the departure of the Chadian army. Paul Biya, who wants to prevent the Seleka from entering Cameroon, is lobbying to limit the role of Chad in the MISCA.⁶³ **The exposing of Chad's responsibility and the withdrawal of Chadian forces appear to be essential** if the vicious circle is to be broken and so that a political settlement to the Central African crisis can be found.

⁵⁷ 9 Dec. 2013, Roland Marchal, 'Interview with *Matin Première*': http://www.rbf.be/info/emissions/article_roland-marchal-est-l-invite-de-matin-premiere?id=8153285

⁵⁸ 11 December 2013, Human Right Watch, **Peter Bouckaert**, article pointing out the present role of General Mahamat Bahar : <http://www.hrw.org/fr/news/2013/12/11/rca-face-au-colonel-zabadi>

⁵⁹ 15 Decem ber 2013, AFP, http://quebec.huffingtonpost.ca/2013/12/15/centrafrique-le-tchad--_n_4447657.html

⁶⁰ 1 January 2013, Central African Republic (CAR): The secret agenda of the rebellion (interview with an official of the Seleka movement <http://afrikarabia.blogspot.com/archive/2013/01/01/centrafrique-rca-l-agenda-secret-de-la-rebellion.html>

⁶¹ Another objective could be to prevent the exploitation of the oil field straddling Chad and CAR

⁶² 10 December 2013, Central African Republic: 'Out with the Chadians, traitors, dogs,' shouted the crowd in Bangui: <http://mali-web.org/afrique/centrafrique-dehors-les-tchadiens-traitres-chiens-crie-the-crowd-bangui>

⁶³ 2 December 2013, Central African Republic: 'Chadian soldiers 'non grata' in the MISCA:' <http://www.lanouvellecentrafrique.info/centrafrique-les-soldats-tchadiens-non-grata-dans-la-misca/>

4. *Islam in Chad: a balancing act or a double game?*

With reference to the 2006-2009 conflict between Chad and Sudan, Jean-François Julliard of the French satirical weekly newspaper, “Le Canard Enchaîné” remarked of “Paris’s ally, Déby... **Paris sees him as a bulwark against Sudanese Islamism and the horrors of Darfur**”.⁶⁴ Again in 2013, against AQMI in Mali, Idriss Déby presents himself in the same way. Chadian reality contradicts this diplomatic imagery which was brought back into service too hastily.

In 1990, when Déby took power thanks to the French Directorate-General for External Security (DGSE), he was surrounded by rebel Sudanese from the Zaghawa people and had obtained the **support of al-Bashir and Hassan Abdallah al-Turabi, a leading cleric of the Muslim Brotherhood**⁶⁵. **Hissein Hassan**, a former Sudanese colonel close to Déby with whom he arrived in Chad in 1990, imam of the Grand Mosque in Ndjamená, currently president of the Islamic Council of Chad, has remained the person with the most influence.⁶⁶ In 1993, some imams demanded that Chad become an “Islamic State”. In the 1990s, the state began to transform society through the control and Islamic takeover of education, the economy and the army. Around 1995 and 1996, violent ‘re-Islamization’ took place. The Muslim Brotherhood, which has a very active presence, divides Muslim religious practice in two when it arrives in a zone. In N’Djaména, in particular, practices have separated.

Literary Arabic became, with French, an official language in 1983, and this was confirmed by the 1996 Constitution. Wanting to **replace French with Arabic**, Déby has gradually made bilingualism compulsory; this happened, for example, in schools, high schools and universities in 2010-2011.⁶⁷ Chad is a mosaic of ethnicities and languages: 120 languages coexist. 24% of Chadians speak French (especially in the South), 6% English, 2.6% literary Arabic (or else speak the dialectal Arabic that is used to do business in large cities). Déby has brought Chad close to the Arab League, to the point where the country joining the league has been mentioned.

According to researcher David Mascré,⁶⁸ “Chad is in the heart of the Sahara-Sahel region, the theater in recent years of increasing growth in radical Islam, and potentially a source of terrorism. Located on the fault line between the Muslim world and the Christian animist world (44% of Chad’s population is Christian), the country has a front seat at the rearranging of social identity in the midst of **ethno-religious clashes which, over the last few years, have shaken up a part of Sub-Saharan Africa.**”

Idriss Déby and Imam Hassan Hissein wish to **Islamize the south inhabited predominantly by Christians**,⁶⁹ through the construction of mosques and the installation of migrants, or with the caravans of missionaries coming from Sudan and living in villages known as ‘Mabruka’

What started in 1991, began to take effect after 2000, under the influence of Saudi Arabia (Salafists, Wahhabists), Qatar (Muslim Brotherhood), and Libya. More and more veiled women are visible in Ndjamená.⁷⁰ Currently, **Wahhabism** is gaining ground. **The first Salafist congress to be held south of the Sahara** took place in Chad in 2012. The percentage of Muslims belonging to radical Islam is increasing, approaching 30% in 2013. Chad has allowed radical organizations to take root, including Dawa Alamia Islamia (World Islamic Call), based in Libya and which builds schools and mosques, or Dawa Alamia

⁶⁴ 5 March 2009, France embarrassed by the Chadian who has disappeared, <http://www.tchadenligne.com/article-28684041.html>

⁶⁵ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hassan_al-Turabi

⁶⁶ Lettre du continent, 23 February 1995: <http://www.africaintelligence.fr/LC-/who-s-who/1995/02/23/hassan-hissene-abakar.29744-ART>. 31 July 2010, ‘L’imam de la grande mosquée de Ndjamená, le nouveau griot de Gaddafi--The Imam of the Grand Mosque in Ndjamená, Gaddafi’s new griot: <http://ambenatna.over-blog.com/article-l-imam-de-la-grande-mosquee-de-ndjamena-le-nouveau-griot-de-khadafi-54751125.html>

⁶⁷ 2010, ‘La langue arabe au tchad--Arabic in Chad’, Jean-Didier Nandiguim Kamnadjí, <http://tcomtchad.info/?p=9732>

⁶⁸ David Mascré, 2007? ‘Tchad-Darfour, les dessous d’une crise--Chad-Darfur, the inside story of a crisis’: http://www.cairn.info/article.php?ID_ARTICLE=GEOEC_043_0105

⁶⁹ Dr. Gali, ‘L’Islam et le Tchad--Islam and Chad’ <http://www.tchadforum.com/node/163>

⁷⁰ 2 April 2013, ‘L’Imam Hassan Hissène Abakar appelle les femmes à se voiler --Imam Hassan Abakar Hissène calls on women to wear the veil: <http://tchad24.unblog.fr/2013/04/02/tchad-limam-hassan-appelle-les-femmes-a-se-voiler/>

(Global Call) funded by Kuwait and Sudan,⁷¹ and, since 2009, Shiite Iran even though Chadian Islam is Sunnite. Tensions have grown between Muslims.

5. *Incompatibility with the Rule of Law*

During the intervention in Mali in May 2013, Idriss Déby was allowed to crush what little opposition still existed in Chad, with very little international response.⁷² He justified this by talking about, “an attempt to organize an Arab Spring.”⁷³ Obviously, he used the fact that he was needed in Mali to eliminate opponents, knowing he would not be able to do it so easily afterwards. The opposition is very weak because of the history of repression; it is therefore possible to subdue it by attacking the leaders who have survived the previous episodes of repression.

According to FIDH, “two members of parliament, two generals and a colonel were arrested”. The two Members of Parliament were “Mahamat Malloum Kadre, member for the Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS, the party of President Déby) and Saleh Makki, from the Coordination of Political Parties for the Defense of the Constitution (CPDC).” “Kebzabo Saleh, President of the National Union for Development and Renewal (UNDR) and leader of the CPDC and Gali Gata Ngote another MP and also member of the CPDC”, were nearly arrested on suspicion of attempted destabilization. “Members of Parliament Gali Gata Ngote and Routouang Yoma Golom were charged with “conspiracy and undermining constitutional order” and imprisoned. MP Ngarjely Yorongar has meanwhile been released and rests at the pleasure of the judicial system as a witness.”

Internet surveillance and the tapping of mobile phones played a large role in the arrests of May 2013. As in Togo and Cameroon, this surveillance is provided by an Israeli system operated by Israeli employees.

Repression has also hit the press, according to FIDH, “The journalist Eric Topona, Secretary General of the Union of Chadian Journalists, was summoned, charged and imprisoned on 6 May last ... prosecuted for “undermining constitutional order” in the context of the case made against Jean Laokolé, a young blogger accused of defamation who has also been imprisoned. The next day, 7 May 2013, the editor of the independent newspaper Abba Garde, Avenir Moussey De la Tchire, was arrested by the judicial police, for the dissemination of articles calling for “hatred and a people’s revolt”, according to the police.” The long arm reached Senegal, where the Habré trial will take place, and from where the blogger Makaila Nguebla, who had lived there since 2005, was expelled.

On October 29, 2013, Chad underwent the Universal Periodic Review of the UN in Geneva.⁷⁴ This review is not directly binding - failure to implement the recommendations is not sanctioned - but it is comprehensive and reliable. Study of its process allows international institutions, NGOs and journalists to refer to legitimate U.N. proceedings to assess progress in implementation of the Rule of Law. How well the State intends to implement reforms can be gauged by how much progress has been made between two reviews, which take place at four year interval intervals. Recommendations to the Government of Chad are made by civil society organizations. Amnesty issued the UN with the most comprehensive assessment of the situation and the most informative recommendations. Beyond the mitigating diplomatic language used for the UPR, the Amnesty paper reveals the nature of the regime, and the paralyzing horror that people have lived through for 23 years.⁷⁵ Each point on the list of grievances is well documented: enforced disappearances, gender-based violence, recruitment and use of child soldiers, prison conditions, deaths in custody, torture and other types of abuse, arbitrary arrests and detention, attacks against human rights

⁷¹ Dr. Gali, ‘Islam and Chad’ <http://www.tchadforum.com/node/163>

⁷² 9 May 2013, updated 07 June 2013, FIDH, LTDH, APTDH : Chad: Crackdown on a background of military tensions, <http://fidh.org/en/africa/Chad/chad-crackdown-on-a-background-of-military-tensions-13388>

⁷³ 7 July 2013, Interview with Le Figaro, <http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2013/06/07/01003-20130607ARTFIG00554-deby-la-libye-est-au-bord-de-l-explosion.php>

⁷⁴ 29 October 2013, Universal Periodic Review for Chad, UN, Geneva, <http://www.upr-info.org/Examen-2013-1722.html>

⁷⁵ 31 July 2013, ‘Suggested recommendations to States considered in the 17th round of the Universal Periodic Review, (17th session, 21 october–1 november 2013), amnesty.org/en/library/asset/IOR41/012/2013/en/bb433783-ef38-4cdc-8d6a-474f74b057d6/ior410122013fr.html

defenders and freedom of expression, harassment of political opponents, ratification and implementation of international standards on human rights, the death penalty. **The enforced disappearances are the crimes that resemble the most the massacres that took place before the improvements made since the end of the war in 2009.**

Amnesty stated in 2013 that, “The State under review done nothing to implement these recommendations.” A little progress has been made but with no advance in what is really essential. The UPR does not take into account the record of the régime since its inception and does not aim to establish truth and justice for all crimes. **Idriss Déby is himself implicated and liable to be held accountable to the justice of his country if ever it manages to be put in place.** He changes his régime slowly, focusing on issues that do not touch him personally. With the renewal of French support in 2013, Déby is trying to improve his image, and he has managed to score political points, but the construction of the rule of law cannot be judged based on diplomacy. As rights progress they interfere with each other, the regime basically blocks everything while making concessions to avoid a buildup of pressure.

Other recommendations had also followed **the war of February 2008, with its massacres and assassinations, including that of Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh**: trials of the government officials who were responsible, compensation of victims, elimination of secret prisons and monitoring of official detention centers, reform of the judicial system and the security sector, an opening up of democratic space and governance. The UN Committee for Human Rights in mid-2009 judged that “serious violations of human rights have been committed with impunity, and continue to happen in Chadian territory, most notably murder, rape, enforced disappearances, arbitrary detentions, torture, and destruction of property, forced displacement and attacks against the civilian population.” 174 recommendations were published on 31 October 2013,⁷⁶ and the Chadian government has until March 2014 to respond.

6. Repression of Opponents and the Press: the weight of the past

The killing of opponents assumes particular importance in Chad due to the disappearance of political leader **Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh** on February 3, 2008 during the battle of N’Djamena. Previously, if only political leaders are considered, leaving to one side journalists and trades union leaders, those murdered were politico-military leaders linked closely to wars. This murder of a civilian leader destabilized the democratic opposition and destroyed hopes for democratization. Idriss Déby is suspected of having ordered the murder of the man who was his main opponent. On 22 July 2013, the Chadian justice system dismissed the case in a way that sounds like a new admission of guilt.⁷⁷ This much too recent crime will continue to pursue Déby: a complaint has been filed against him in France, and the case is mentioned in the Universal Periodic Review.

Other political leaders have suffered **repression and arrest**, especially the Member of Parliament Ngarjely Yorongar, arrested and tortured 14 times. Recently, in 2012 and 2013, the MPs Kebzabo Saleh, Gali Ngote Gata and Saleh Makki were harassed by a Chadian justice system acting under orders. Trade unionists are targeted for repression, among them Michel Barka, of the Union Syndicale of Chad (UST), imprisoned in 2008; François Djondang and Yunus Mahadjir, two other leaders of the UST prosecuted in 2012; Gustave Mbailaou Betar who died in prison in December 2012, after being arrested for smiling at a hearing. Leaders of human rights associations have been targeted, including Mr. Joseph **Behidi**, President of the Chadian League for Human Rights, murdered on February 16, 1992; and, more recently, Daniel Deuzoumbe Passalet, President of Human Rights without Borders (DHSF) arrested in 2011.

However, the repression of freedom of the press and opponents in 2013 is of lower level intensity than in the past. The Justice system has released some prisoners, the Chadian parliament voted against the

⁷⁶ Human Rights Council Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, Draft report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review - Chad, http://www.upr-info.org/IMG/pdf/a_hrc_wg.6_17_L12_chad.pdf

⁷⁷ 26 July 2013, Disappearance of Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh: Chadian justice dismisses the case, jeuneafrique.com, July 25, 2013, a new deadlock in the investigation of the disappearance of the opponent Ibni Oumar **Saleh** rfi.fr

removal of parliamentary immunity for its members Lama Tchindébé and Saleh Kebzabo that was wanted by Déby.⁷⁸ If one considers the nature of the regime over a period longer than the past few years, this repression is currently taking place at a level equivalent to what can happen in other countries with less ferocious régimes. However tensions persist because of the regime's past history. Paradoxically, since the beginning of the war in Mali in 2013, the publicizing and highlighting by the media of frequent low intensity repression has largely eclipsed the record of the last 23 years and has allowed the Chadian regime to present itself as a lower-level dictatorship than it is in reality. A back-and-forth of rehashed aggression and the "noise" about interventions abroad trivializes the level of the dictatorship for those who are satisfied with current events and who don't look at the record of the regime over 23 years.

The wave of arrests began immediately after the outbreak of war in Mali⁷⁹ so that it could not provoke demands for change in Chad, based on the argument that the war in Mali was for the restoration of democracy. Even if imprisoned in 2013 were often released after a few days, weeks or months, the whole series of arrests created a climate of terror. A French implicit guarantee was added: criticism leveled by French diplomats is weak enough to be understood as an agreement not to bring up what is of real concern.

The Chadian Press has not been able to expand, and this can be seen in the format of independent newspapers, the largest of which come out on letter-size paper and once a week, at most. There is no independent printer, only the Chadian state printing office. Before publication, newspaper publishers must obtain authorization, from "**The High Council for Communication**", which practices radical censorship.

Demonstrations are routinely banned by the authorities. In 23 years, the only demonstration that could begin to be held was a gathering of women in 2001 in front of the French Embassy in N'Djamena to challenge the electoral process. It was quickly dispersed with use of live ammunition, with the French ambassador looking on. The lawyer Jacqueline Moudeina was seriously injured by a grenade. **Freedom to demonstrate is a basic demand requirement for unlocking the democratic process.** After the war in Mali, what will the French army do if the Chadian army fires once again on peaceful protesters?

7. A Caricatural Petro-Monarchy

On 29 September 2013, the Chadian Minister of Finance announced a tripling of oil production by 2015: 200,000 barrels a day in 2014 and 300,000 in 2015, although production fell to 100,000 barrels in 2013, far from the record level of 173,000 set in 2005. Even if this announcement is open to doubt, Chad could catch up with neighboring countries such as Gabon which has been at 250,000 barrels a day since 2007, or Congo-Brazzaville at 270,000 barrels a day in 2012. In 2011, Chad's reserves were estimated at 2 billion barrels. **Oil has been pumped since 2003 by the Consortium** made up of the Esso subsidiary of Exxon (USA), Chevron (USA), Petronas Carigali (Malaysia), and, more recently, two other companies: CNPCI (China) and OPIC (Taiwan). A Sino-Chadian refinery was opened in 2011. **Chad reaps 28.7% of the profits compared to 72.3% for the Consortium,** according to the Africa Europe Faith and Justice Network.⁸⁰ Currently, the country has thus been able to recoup up to \$1.2 billion in 2007.⁸¹ Recently, it decided to create an investment fund of \$50 billion with the help of Samuel Maréchal, a former leader of the French National Front.⁸²

⁷⁸ 4 September 2013, L Lifting of the parliamentary immunity of Lama Tchindébé and Saleh Kebzabo: When parliament said NO to the executive: Chadian paradox (Country): <http://fr.africatime.com/articles/when-the-parliament-says-not-to-lexecutif-le-paradox-Chad>

⁷⁹ 9 May 2013, FIDH, LTDH APTDH wave of crackdowns amid military tensions, <http://www.fidh.org/tchad-vague-de-repression-sur-fond-de-tensions-militaires-13248>, 12 July 2013, .7.13, a repressive wind sweeps over Chad, <http://www.la-croix.com/Actualite/Monde/Un-vent-repressif-s-abat-sur-le-Tchad-2013-07-12-985373>

⁸⁰ 2011 The exploitation of oil in Chad and the population of the region, Africa Faith and Justice Network Europe, <http://www.aefjn.org/index.php/materiel-410/articles/exploitation-du-petrole-au-tchad-et-la-population-de-la-region.html>

⁸¹ 26 August 2009, International Crisis Group : "Tchad: sortir du piège pétrolier—Chad, escaping from the oil trap", [http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/central-africa/chad/French%20translations/B065%20Chad%20Escaping%20from%20the%20Oil%20Trap%20French.pdf](http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/chad/French%20translations/B065%20Chad%20Escaping%20from%20the%20Oil%20Trap%20French.pdf)

⁸² 26 October 2013, 'M&A financing livens up in Chad', <http://africaintelligence.fr/LC-/holding-and-business/2013/10/02/m-afinance-s-active-au-tchad,107979217-BRE>

In October 2012, Chad released its latest **“Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative” report (EITI)**⁸³ Its engagement in the EITI process is positive, but there is still much uncertainty about its will to implement EITI transparency rules. Over a period of 10 years, oil has brought in €7.5 billion⁸⁴, but this wealth has been captured by the clan in power centered on Déby’s family. Chad remained, in March 2013, **184th out of 186 in the UNDP 2012 Human Development Report Index.**⁸⁵ In 2008, the World Bank withdrew from Chad noting its disappointment about the level of the fight against poverty, increases in the level of corruption and a decline in the quality of the legal system and administrative services.⁸⁶

The state budget almost quadrupled between 2002 and 2012 from, €595 million to €2.3 billion. The number of civil servants has increased significantly. The lust for oil money and the absence of prospects for political change have led to rebellions. Oil money has enabled the **rapid strengthening of the Chadian army since 2003**⁸⁷ without the revenues benefiting the impoverished population. Oil has funded the longevity of the regime, through corruption, buying of consciences, and the purchase of weapons to reinforce the army faced with rebellions, to the tune of € 50 million in 2004, €420 million in 2008, and €240 million in 2010.

The money has permitted construction of infrastructure, especially roads, but without transparent bidding processes and with a high level of corruption. State expenditures are not known, and a large part of the budget is used by the Department of Major Presidential Works.⁸⁸ The eldest brother of Idriss Déby, Daoussa Déby heads⁸⁹ “La Société nouvelle d’études et de réalisations, The New Company for Studies and Works (SNER)” a company which subcontracts out the work of building roads in Chad.

Since 2003, thanks to this black gold, **Chad has quickly become an oil state**, with all the difficulties encountered in this type of country: **a rent-seeking economy, lack of social modernization, absence of democracy, a political system under lockdown and repression.** According to International Crisis Group in 2009⁹⁰, “Oil has become a means for the regime to strengthen its armed forces, reward its cronies and co-opt members of the political class. This has further limited political space for the opposition and helped keep the country in a state of political paralysis that has stoked antagonism between the regime and its opponents.”

This windfall has led to “Ill-gotten gains” in Chad and abroad, most notably in South Africa, Malaysia and Tunisia. There is both low-level and high-level corruption, both internal and from foreigners in the country. Since there are significant risks to revealing corruption when it occurs, in a country where the press is not free and repression is strong, **political corruption is poorly documented.** Whenever a new personality begins to stand out in civil society, or when a political party does effective social or political work, contact is made with them and financial assistance is given, and this leads to the person or party being absorbed into the dictatorial system.

Since the scandal of the **false Bahraini dinars**, the main people responsible have never been held to account. Verschave, in his book, ‘Noir Silence—Black Silence’, and especially the Member of Parliament

⁸³ <http://eiti.org/Chad>

⁸⁴ 11 May 2013, Le Monde, ‘Au Tchad, la répartition de la manne pétrolière suscite le mécontentement—In Chad, the dividing up of the oil windfall creates discontent’; http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2013/05/11/au-tchad-la-manne-petroliere-ne-profitent-toujours-pas-a-la-population_3175594_3210.html

⁸⁵ March 28, 2013, 2012 Human Development Report Index, http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2013_EN_complete.pdf

⁸⁶ 20 November 2009, ‘The World Bank Group Program of Support for the Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Construction : Program Performance Assessment Report’, <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTOED/Resources/ChadCamReport.pdf>

⁸⁷ 30 January 2012, CCFD report ‘Development Trapped: arms transfers and the development of Chad (2005-2010)’: France and other countries have sold weapons to Chad. http://ccfd-terresolidaire.org/ewb_pages/d/doc_2739.php?PHPSESSID=248a290fe4fe24669f77f4b4d11f036

⁸⁸ <http://www.tchadoscopie.com/article-tchad-qui-controle-les-fonds-geres-par-la-direction-des-grands-travaux-presidentiels-111337648.html>

See also: June 2013, Roland Marchal in *African Politics* p. 6, <http://www.politique-africaine.com/numeros/pdf/conjonctures/130213.pdf>

⁸⁹ For details see: 10/23/13, ‘“coming out” of Daoussa Déby Itno, Mr. Brother’: <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/JA2754p016.xml0/>

⁹⁰ 26 August 2009, International Crisis Group: Chad: Escaping from the oil trap <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/central-africa/chad/B065%20Chad%20Escaping%20from%20the%20Oil%20Trap.ashx>

Yorongar denounced Déby's participation in the trafficking of counterfeit currency by producing numerous items of incriminating evidence.⁹¹

Idriss Déby has also developed a **system of external corruption, of influential foreign players**. Given the difficulties in investigating corruption, there are often suspicious signs that can only be reported with great caution: abnormal friendships, travel assistance, discontinuities in speeches, statements of suspect points of view, weak clues seen from the outside, which, even in the absence of evidence, constitute near absolute certainties for knowledgeable Chadians. The list of Déby's friends is lengthy and difficult to establish: key people who sign off on elections, French researchers used to the media, foreign journalists, French military personnel, French politicians, UN staff, and civil society in other African countries, including some who work for human rights organizations, officials from other countries... How can people denounce what is happening when fear reigns and when each revelation comes at a very high price? The essence of dictatorships is to keep under wraps this corruption which creates networks of strategic support, such as that of Ben Ali in Tunisia.

8. *The "Pacified Democracy" which Has Never Fooled Anybody*

Idriss Déby has no democratic legitimacy. After seizing power by force of arms, he was permanently installed in 1996 by the French experts in electoral fraud, Jérôme Grand d'Esnon and André Rouge, at a time when Françafrique could do whatever it liked.⁹² Multiparty democracy in the 1990s, like in many other countries, was just a façade to hide the absence of valid electoral processes. Like the other dictators, Idriss Déby then only had to engage in fraudulent elections to crush his opposition.

The last two masquerades, the legislative and presidential elections in 2011, with nothing at stake,⁹³ were quietly signed off on by a timid and almost shameful European Union, under the eye of Louis Michel, the expert in electoral dictatorships who provided Déby with the same service he had rendered to Eyadéma Junior in Togo during the 2010 presidential election. The agreement of 13 August 2007⁹⁴ was gutted of its substance.⁹⁵ The presidential election was boycotted by the main opposition parties.⁹⁶ Chad is a caricature of a dictatorship, but the most outrageous caricature is that of the sham foreign support for a nonexistent process of democratization. The most recent parliamentary elections, in 2011, demonstrated once again both the lack of European Union political power⁹⁷ and the compromises some of its people make.

On August 7, 2013, a so-called Independent National Electoral Commission was created.⁹⁸ Parliamentary elections are planned for 2015 (February). **The next presidential election will be in 2016.** What progress can be expected? How long will it take before a credible opposition can take shape, free from both the pressures of repression and corruption (sometimes in the guise of cooptation)? For the time being, very little progress has been made, and the lack of prospects for political change has favored the creation of rebel armed forces. In a situation where there is no renewal among the senior members of the regime, where the government is working without a program, Déby will doubtless try to impose total control. Déby is assisted

⁹¹ 24 November 2009, excerpt from Yorongar's book, 'Tchad, le procès d'Idriss Déby—Chad, Idriss Déby on trial' http://www.yorongar.com/imprimer.php?id_article=225

⁹² François-Xavier Verschave in 'Noir Chirac-Black Chirac' in 2002, p. 225 of the chapter 'Making legitimate Brother Déby, Executioner of the Chadians'

⁹³ 10 May 2011, Gaëtan Gorce: 'Reaction after the proclamation of the results of the presidential election in Chad', gorce.typepad.fr

⁹⁴ http://eeas.europa.eu/chad/accord_politique_2007_fr.pdf

⁹⁵ See the recommendations of International Crisis Group, 17 August 2010, 'Chad, Beyond Superficial Stability': <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/chad/162-chad-beyond-superficial-stability.aspx>

⁹⁶ 26 April 2011, boycott: Presidential Campaign: The trio of opponents are not giving : <http://www.journaldutchad.com/article.php?aid=1113>

⁹⁷ In 2013, the European Union tried to define its policy: 12 December 2013, Council conclusions on report from the Commission on EU support for democratic governance, with a focus on the governance initiative, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/140056.pdf

⁹⁸ 3 September 2013, civil society tries to master the 'Independent National Electoral Commission (the CENI)' <http://makaila.over-blog.com/article-tchad-la-societe-civile-a-la-conquete-de-la-ceni-119860621.html>

by many legal experts.⁹⁹ The National Framework for Policy Dialogue (CNDP) is controlled by the regime, and comes in for severe criticism from the democratic opposition, in particular from the Coordination of Parties for the Defense of the Constitution (CPDC).¹⁰⁰

Oil money allows Déby to finance political activities in Africa in a way similar to that used by Gaddafi. He intimidates other presidents, particularly in West Africa, and in this way he **undermines democracy wherever it begins to take root**, for example in Senegal when he imposed, through the organization of the Habré trial, a step backwards in the freedom of the press, with the expulsion of the blogger Makaila Nguebla.¹⁰¹

The democratization of Central Africa is currently impossible. The fates of Chad, the Central African Republic, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Congo Brazzaville and Gabon are linked. The dictators of these countries are broadly supportive of each other: Five of these six countries suffer from long-lasting dictatorships which were put in place and have since been reinforced by Françafrique. This political deadlock is the result of the policy France has historically practiced in the region in order to favor its own oil supplies. Even though the dictators have gained greater independence in recent years, their future depends on the evolution of French policy.

9. French Support for Idriss Déby has Never Wavered

Without going as far back as French colonial crimes in Chad¹⁰², **French compromises with Déby began with Habré**, “During the time of Hissène Habré, a great friend to France, corpses floated on the Chari River which flows through N’Djamena, beside the park of the French Ambassador’s residence.”¹⁰³

Idriss Déby came to power in 1990, propelled by Paul Fontbonne, an officer of France’s Directorate-General for External Security (the DGSE).¹⁰⁴ From December 1990 to June 1994, Fontbonne remained a presidential adviser to Déby. In his book ‘Noir silence - Black Silence’, Verschave stated: “Until October 1998, 20 DGSE agents trained the Republican Guard,”¹⁰⁵ at a time when the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs (the “Quai d’Orsay”) put in immense lobbying efforts each year to save the beloved Déby **from the solicitude of the UN Commission on Human Rights.**”

In the 1990s, French leaders hoped to get a share of the **Chadian oilfields for Elf**, which was part of the international consortium (Elf, Esso, Shell) responsible for exploitation of oil after the construction of the Chad-Cameroon pipeline: “Mr. Yorongar has spoken out strongly, in particular against the way the project is being managed by the entourage of the Head of State, Mr. Idriss Déby, and denounced—the first time was during the presidential campaign of June and July 1996, Elf’s financing of the election campaign of Messrs. Déby and Kamougué, now President of the Republic and President of the National Assembly.”¹⁰⁶ Elf and Shell then withdrew from the consortium in late 1999.

In line with the Françafrique modus operandi, **in 1997 the Chadian army was used in Congo-Brazzaville**, an oil producing country where Elf played an active part the civil war, “the French air force would make

⁹⁹ Among whom are the Study and Research Group on Democracy and Economic and Social Development (GERDDES-Chad)

¹⁰⁰ 20 November 2013, RFI: ‘Au Tchad, le président Déby reçoit l’opposition--In Chad President Déby receives the Opposition <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20131120-tchad-deby-ali-gabriel-golhor-cpdc>

¹⁰¹ 12 June 2013, Interview with Makaila Nguebla, <http://survie.org/billets-d-afrique/2013/225-juin-2013/article/makaila-nguebla-je-suis-indigne-4492>

¹⁰² ‘Tchad Index chronologique 1900-1960’, par M. Debos April 2008, <http://www.massviolence.org/IMG/pdf/Tchad-Index-chronologique-1900-1960.pdf>

¹⁰³ Roger Vincent Calatayud, Report of the observation mission to Chad (4-11 February 1992) quoted by Survie in 1996: <http://survie.org/publications/les-dossiers-noirs/dossier-noir-no3-france-tchad/article/tchad-la-metropole-sans-boussole>

¹⁰⁴ 2000 ‘Noir silence - Black silence’, François-Xavier Verschave, Les Arènes, pp151-171: Chapter 8 ‘Chad, oil and Dictatorship: p. 153

¹⁰⁵ 2000 ‘Noir silence - Black silence’, François-Xavier Verschave, Les Arènes, pp. 154-171: Chapter 8 ‘Chad, oil and dictatorship’

¹⁰⁶ June-July 1996 + 6 March 2001 Yorongar - FX Verschave trial against Déby, ‘Noir Procès - Black Trial’, FXVerschave, May 2001

military transport aircraft available to Chadian soldiers sent to the Congo to fight alongside Sassou Nguesso. The aircraft took off from Abéché (Chad), a home from home for France”.¹⁰⁷

Exploitation of oil having been abandoned by the French side, the French army has remained the key French player in Chad. **As in Rwanda between 1990 and 1994, the mixture of political and military responsibilities** when faced with the observation of numerous crimes committed by an ally, has encouraged mutual silence. Who shares what responsibility, between the politicians and the military, is difficult to evaluate. They share the same interests. French support for Déby over the past 23 years, including justification of the collaboration in Mali and in the Central African Republic, has meant staying silent about all of the crimes committed.

In 2006 and 2008, threatened by rebellions, Idriss Déby was saved twice by the French army. In 2008, according to some reports, Sarkozy based his decision to save Déby more on a ‘theory of stability’ than on a good relationship with the president in power. The country was considered to be an area of military importance, where power could not be acquired through the ballot box, and where no alternative to Déby existed.

By dint of being in the position of observer, the French government found itself involved, in February 2008, in **the assassination of opposition leader Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh** through the alleged presence close by of French military personnel Jean-Marc Marill and Colonel Jean-Marc Gadoullet. As a result of charges filed by the children of Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh to the Genocide and Crimes against Humanity Department of the Tribunal de Grande Instance of Paris, an investigation of the murder started in the summer of 2013. It is being conducted by the French magistrate Emmanuelle Ducos and should shed more light on the affair. This charge is one of many registered in France concerning Françafrique: the Rwanda genocide, ‘Ill-gotten gains’, the ‘Borrel case in Djibouti’, and the ‘Beach affair of Congo-Brazzaville’.

Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh, the leader of the Party for Liberties and Development (PLD), was a mathematician widely recognized in France. **Until May 2012, the French Socialist Party involved itself in seeking justice and truth** for this affair which implicated the Chadian dictator. In 2008, Nicolas Sarkozy asked for French and European observers to be present in the Chadian Commission of Inquiry. In 2010, Jean-Marc Ayrault, then a member of parliament, pushed by Gaëtan Gorce¹⁰⁸, the main supporter of the struggle for truth and justice, also signed a resolution calling on the French government to intervene again.¹⁰⁹ On 25 July 2013, the Chadian justice system was able to dismiss the case, “...because the perpetrators, accomplices and accessories could not be identified”¹¹⁰ without that alienating it from François Hollande. Since the war in Mali, Gaëtan Gorce has been isolated, and the government is again pushing the Socialist Party to embrace Françafrique.

¹⁰⁷ Le Nouvel Observateur 9/25/97 citing the Chadian opposition, in La Françafrique, the longest scandal of the Republic, François-Xavier Verschave (Survie), 1998, pp. 311-313

¹⁰⁸ 4 December 2012, Gaëtan Gorce: ‘La France doit continuer d’exiger la vérité sur la disparition d’Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh— France must continue to demand the truth about the disappearance of Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh’;
<http://gorce.typepad.fr/blog/2012/12/la-france-doit-continuer-dexiger-la-v%C3%A9rit%C3%A9-sur-la-disparition-de-lopposant-tchadien-ibni-oumar-maham.html>

¹⁰⁹ 25 March 2010, resolution adopted by the French National Assembly ‘Foreign Affairs: disappearance of Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh in Chad on 3 February 2008’ tabled by Socialist Party MPs Messrs.. Gaëtan Gorce, Jean-Marc Ayrault, Serge Janquin, François Loncle, ... http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/dossiers/resol_disparition_tchad.asp

¹¹⁰ July 26, 2013, ‘Disappearance of Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh: Chadian justice dismisses the case’, jeunefrique.com, July 25, 2013, ‘a new deadlock in the investigation of the disappearance of the opponent Ibni Oumar Saleh’, rfi.fr

10. *What Does the French Army Do in Chad?*

As the website of the Chadian presidency said so well on 18 October 2013, the Chief of Staff of the French armed forces, “Admiral Edouard Guillaud is a regular sight in the corridors of the Presidential Palace”.¹¹¹ The French soldiers of “**Opération Epervier--Operation Sparrowhawk**” which started in February 1986, legionnaires, army and air force soldiers, were in place at the side of the Chadian government even before the arrival of Idriss Déby. Before that the French army had built up a long history of collaboration with Chadian soldiers in 1914-1918, 1939-1945, in Madagascar, Indochina, and Cameroon. Chad is regarded as a military zone.

This presence influenced the decisions of successive French governments, and in the 1990s, according to Verschave “In Paris, what was ‘desired’ by officers who had been or were in Chad (a good-sized lobby) was perceived as an order.”¹¹² This presence is the link between the regimes of Habré and Déby: “From the killings of ‘Black September’ in 1984 to those of the autumn and winter of 1997-1998, it was the French army that provided the logistics, as one says discreetly, i.e. who took the killers to their place of work. During the slaughter, the French instructors or advisers who accompanied them looked the other way.”¹¹³

In 1996, the French NGO Survie quoted Tibe Kalande, President of Chad Non-Violence, “Today, [France] **supports with one hand the democratic process, and with the other it trains the Republican Guard, which is in fact the author of all the massacres** that have taken place in Chad. This ambiguity shocks Chadians (108). [...] Under the pretext of reorganizing the army, France equips (with all-terrain vehicles, rifles, ...) and trains the Guard. French instructors supervise them. France is playing a double game.”¹¹⁴

The French army has had a ringside seat in observing the crimes of Idriss Déby. In February 1998, at Sarh in southern Chad, after the kidnapping of four French people by Mahamout Nahor, massacres were committed on the orders of Déby while French soldiers were nearby. Also, according to Verschave, “Mopping up operations resulted in 57 victims, mostly civilians. Chadian troops were supported by members of Operation Sparrowhawk and a French helicopter.”¹¹⁵ The French army is also said to have witnessed in February 2008 the assassination of the leader of the democratic opposition, Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh.

Sultan Déby is loved by the French General Staff. The French army has continued its collaboration while crimes have piled up, condoning impunity and thus contributing to the **trivialization of crimes against humanity**. Amnesty reports have come out listing many crimes, especially in the 1990s, but no changes to French military policy have been made to distance it from Déby.

French military cooperation has helped Déby to stay in power, in particular through the two French interventions to save him in 2006 and 2008 when he was faced with rebellions from the East. According to Raphael Granvaud in, “What Does the French Army Do in Africa?” (Survie, 2009), in 2006, “According to the FUC (United Front for Democratic Change) and the opposition movements, French aircraft not only directly targeted attackers, even in the capital, without regard to “collateral damage” but may also have bombed the cities of Adre and Moudeïna (on the border with Sudan), causing numerous civilian casualties.”¹¹⁶

On 28 January 2008, when N’Djamena was under threat by between 2,000 and 3,000 men armed by Sudan, the French army intervened again. According to two journalists of the monthly magazine

¹¹¹ 18 October 2013, Chad-France Cooperation: http://www.presidencetchad.org/affichage_news.php?id=737&titre=%20Lire%20article

¹¹² 2000 ‘Noir silence - Black silence’, François-Xavier Verschave, Les Arènes, pp151-171: Chapter 8 Chad, oil and Dictatorship: p 153

¹¹³ 2000 ‘Noir silence - Black silence’, François-Xavier Verschave, Les Arènes, pp151-171: Chapter 8 Chad, oil and Dictatorship: p 153

¹¹⁴ November 1994, ‘Non-violence actualité - Non-Violence News, quoted by French NGO Survie in 1996

<http://survie.org/publications/les-dossiers-noirs/dossier-noir-no3-france-tchad/article/tchad-la-metropole-sans-boussole>

¹¹⁵ 2000 ‘Noir silence - Black silence’, François-Xavier Verschave, Les Arènes, pp151-171: Chapter 8 Chad, oil and Dictatorship: p 153

¹¹⁶ 5 October 2009, What does the French army in Africa, Raphael Granvaud, Survie, ‘Dossier Noir - Black File’, pp. 305-308:

<http://survie.org/publications/les-dossiers-noirs/article/que-fait-the-french-army-in>

“Marchés tropicaux - Tropical Markets”, quoted by Raphael Granvaud, “In command was Colonel Jean-Marc Marill, Defense Attaché at the Embassy of France in N’Djamena. Throughout the fighting, he directed operations on behalf of Idriss Déby.”¹¹⁷ **General Puga, personal chief of staff to the President of France since 2010**, and very influential in the Malian conflict, was the intermediary between Colonel Marill and Sarkozy. Le Monde wrote on 15 October 2010, “According to several observers, he (Puga) has become one of the most influential people around François Hollande... in the absence of a clear political strategy, the military and their networks are today the gatekeepers of Franco-African relations.”¹¹⁸ The follow-up European operation EUFOR Chad-CAR-(2008-2009), under French influence, came in for some severe criticism from International Crisis Group: “Thanks to EUFOR Chad-CAR, France has actively contributed to strengthening Déby without helping Chadians to find a lasting solution to their crisis.”¹¹⁹

To what extent is the will to support the Chadian president also linked to **arms sales** during the period of economic crisis that began in 2008? In 2013, the ‘Malian diplomatic rent’ strengthens his role in “peace and security” which could justify the reinforcing of his army.

Chad is a very corrupt country. Like other dictators, Idriss Déby has put in place his own system for **bribery of foreign supporters, in Chad and elsewhere**. Evidence of corruption is always hard to obtain when the press has been reduced to a minimum and investigation is impossible. The risk of corruption increases with the length of presence in the country.¹²⁰ The consequence of possible corruption of French officers by the Chadian regime is that Idriss Déby would have leverage to influence French policy. It must be hoped that that is not the case, but some confidential sources, in view of the danger, have already sown doubt.¹²¹ The question deserves to be asked so that all aspects of Operation Sparrowhawk and how long it should last can be evaluated.

Furthermore, to overcome the shortcomings of the Chadian government, **the French army plays a humanitarian and social role**, thanks to the Sparrowhawk military hospital, or by intervening in cases of fire or natural disaster.¹²² The Chadian population is also sensitive to jobs which come from the French army presence. Civil cooperation, distancing itself from assistance provided by the Chadian regime, could have long since improved the state of Chad. The European Union shows on its balance sheet, the “drilling of 4,700 wells for access to water in 8 regions and the construction, rehabilitation and equipping of 18 hospitals and more than 50 operating theaters”.¹²³

The Chadian army which collaborates daily with the French army participates in repression, in particular by preventing the population from expressing itself freely and from engaging in peaceful protests. **If ever freedom of expression finally begins to be possible in Chad, it will be interesting to observe how French troops will react in the case of a decline in freedom and violent repression**. For the moment Déby, talks unashamedly of the need to repress those who dream of an “Arab Spring”.¹²⁴

¹¹⁷ 5 October 2009, What does the French army do in Africa?, Raphael Granvaud, ‘Dossier Noir - Black File’, pp. 308-322: <http://survie.org/publications/les-dossiers-noirs/article/que-fait-l-armee-French-en->

¹¹⁸ 15 October 2013, Le Monde, Serge Michel, ‘In the absence of an African network, François Hollande puts the army in the front line: http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2013/10/15/faute-de-reseau-africain-francois-hollande-met-l-armee-en-premiere-ligne_3496218_3210.html

¹¹⁹ 5 October 2009, What Does the French Army do in Africa?, Raphael Granvaud, ‘Dossier Noir - Black File’, Survie, p. 253: <http://survie.org/publications/les-dossiers-noirs/article/que-fait-l- French-army-in->

¹²⁰ 12 December 2013, ‘vidéo d’officiers français au mariage du frère de Déby—a video of French army officers at the wedding of Déby’s brother’,: <http://www.tchadenligne.com/article-tchad-des-officiers-fran-ais-lancent-des-billets-de-banque-pour-le-mariage-du-frere-du-president-121572412.html>, <http://makaila.over-blog.com/2013/12/apr%C3%A9s-les-enfants-de-deby-voil%C3%A0-une-vid%C3%A9o-qui-%C3%A9clabousse-l-arm%C3%A9e-fran%C3%A7aise-au-tchad.html>

¹²¹ See also the example of demobilization severance pay in 1992: 2000, ‘Noir silence - Black Silence, FX Verschave, ed. Les Arènes, pp. 151-171: Chapter 8 ‘Chad, Oil and Dictatorship: p. 169

¹²² 28 July 2011, ‘Towards a redefinition of the French military presence in Chad?’:

<http://www.france24.com/fr/20110728-dispositif-epervier-dispositif-alain-juppe-tchad-presence-militaire-francaise-aqmi>

¹²³ 7 November 2013, The European Union announces a strengthening of its development assistance to Chad for 2014-2020, European Commission Press release: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1033_fr.htm

¹²⁴ 8 June 2013, ‘Le risque djihadiste libyen menace le Tchad, assure Idriss Déby—The Libyan Jihadist risk threatens Chad, says Idriss Déby’: <http://www.france24.com/fr/20130608-risque-djihadiste-libye-menace-tchad-assure-idriss-deby>

11. *In 2013, the Attempt at Rehabilitation is via Paris*

In 2013, collaboration with France in its intervention in Mali, opened the door for Déby to participate in international discussions on peace and security in Africa. The rest of the international community has amnesia. On 18 October 2013, at the United Nations, only 9 states out of 193 did not vote for Chad and Chad was elevated to the position of non-permanent member of the Security Council for the 2014-2015. **To rehabilitate diplomatically Idriss Déby is equivalent to rehabilitating all the other dictators with a lesser record of crime**, and in particular those in the former French colonies. To give a “diplomatic” amnesty for the crimes of his 23-year reign in Chad opens the door to other amnesties elsewhere.

For military reasons, the government and the French president either went looking for or accepted help from the Chadian army in Mali.¹²⁵ At the same time, they could have **asked for guarantees with regard to democracy and human rights in Chad, but that was done so weakly that it barely amounts to having been done at all**: “The principles we support must be respected, including in Chad,” is what François Hollande limited himself to saying on 10 May 2013.¹²⁶ Hollande spoke about the repression of journalists and opponents that took place in May 2013, and that was right but it also represented a shift in reality and an understatement, because this additional ratcheting up of Déby’s attacks on the press is only a visible, small and recent part of the story. Idriss Déby was merely silencing those who still held out, the people he had not yet eliminated, the few who had survived 23 years of ill treatment; the cleaning out had been done upstream. Hollande has avoided talking about French collaboration with the Chadian regime during the preceding most violent periods, and thus his statement, “I have *convictions*, I repeated this to President Déby,”¹²⁷ was clearly understood as a guarantee for a certain level of “impunity” in exchange for services rendered in Mali.

Facts are stubborn, but they do not all carry the same weight. To speak only of the last child soldiers in Chad in 2013, of one sole rape in Mali in 2013, repression of the press and a few opponents in 2013, without establishing the context and without mentioning the record of the previous 23 years of the regime, indirectly contributes to the international rehabilitation of a dictator with a long list of major crimes to his name, and this applies to Holland as well as to a few humanitarian NGOs who have become too specialized. **Communicating only about the recent 1% of a dictator’s record is to risk obscuring 99% of his crimes.**

Chad was elected to the Security Council of the United Nations 18 October 2013 by 184 votes in favor out of 193. Whatever one may infer from this vote about respect of human rights at the UN, this vote is also the result of Chadian support for the French intervention in Mali. Before that, nothing suggested that this country which ranks near the end of every (international) ranking should be proposed.

At the international level, the idea seems **implicitly to be to pardon indirectly all crimes committed before the signing of the Treaty of Rome.** As, in Chad, most of the crimes against humanity and the greatest number of massacres date from the 1990s, it is primarily these crimes of the 1990s that are concealed, all these crimes that were committed in the presence of the French army in Chad. This is only possible because of the very high level of repression over the last 30 years against all organizations working on human rights. Déby is attempting to make people forget the crimes he committed during the many civil war massacres since 1984, his role in the Darfur conflict, or more recently his strong relationship with Gaddafi, both before and during his fall in 2011.

In 2013, the image of the Chadian president has been artificially and superficially cleaned up, for international political reasons because the increase in **terrorism in the Sahel** has become a major issue.

¹²⁵ 29 July 2012, AFP, Laurent Fabius evokes the Malian situation in Chad with Idriss Déby:

<http://www.20minutes.fr/politique/978371-laurent-fabius-evoque-situation-malienne-tchad-idriss-deby>

¹²⁶ 11 May 2013, Le Monde, Arrests in Chad: the unfortunate silence of Paris, http://www.lemonde.fr/a-la-une/article/2013/05/11/arrestations-au-tchad-le-silence-regrettable-de-paris_3175647_3208.html

¹²⁷ 31 May 2013, An exclusive Interview with François Hollande, <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130531-francois-hollande-interview-exclusive-rfi-mali-syrie-afrique-entretien-france>

Even if Déby is also threatened by this, he is trying above all to increase his value internationally by playing with European and American fears of terrorism. However, his supporters are also taking a risk, in the same way as Nicolas Sarkozy took a risk with Gaddafi from 2007. There may well be a price to pay one day for this support provided against truth and justice. Is Western pressure to diminish repression being considered, to offset the effects of rehabilitation gained through “Peace and Security” in Mali?

12. *Peace and Security in Africa without Democracy and the Rule of Law?*

François Hollande’s speeches of 2012 and early 2013 in favor of democracy, given in Kinshasa¹²⁸ and to the European Parliament,¹²⁹ fade into the background when compared to acts of support, either stated or implied, to non-democratic regimes, and in 2013 **the government seems to be improvising its foreign policy in Africa by focusing only on crisis management. This priority benefits the French and African players who are the least legitimate or who dispose of military force.**

The will to train and lead African armies¹³⁰ to face up to conflicts does not take into account the fact that most of these armies are used to keep dictators in power. As a result, **France’s African policy appears to be the victim of French Army influence and the military-industrial lobby.** The other aspects, such as development, human rights, democracy, and the fight against corruption have become secondary.

In times of fiscal crisis which push towards savings and cost sharing, the influence of the military and the industrial lobby also affects the European Union. European construction has progressed over several decades and European foreign policy is still badly defined. In December 2013, with the Foreign Affairs Council on Development Issues¹³¹, and the European Council on the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)¹³² European equilibrium was sought across different dimensions: defense, development and democracy. If French influence remains predominant in Chad because of the military presence, this influence is also shared with the EU. The general objectives are becoming more clearly defined, but on the ground in Chad it is difficult to implement them; in the framework of the 11th European Development Fund (EDF) for 2014-2020, **the European Union just announced €442 million of development aid, without insisting on conditions,**¹³³ although Chad itself has announced an increase in its oil production.

The statement of the European Commission of 8 November 2013 on the occasion of the visit of Development Commissioner Andris Piebalgs to Chad says that “in March 2011 the European Union adopted a Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel. This strategy is based on recognition of the regional nature of the crisis and the indissoluble link between security and development. It has made it possible to consolidate a common European position on the regional crisis and to mobilize significant financial resources for security and development projects. **At present, the EU is determined to pursue the implementation of this strategy and to extend its scope to Burkina Faso and Chad.**” The message was delivered with great fanfare during a joint trip by the Secretary General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon and the Chairperson of the African Union, Dlamini Zuma. European policy is defined at a level higher than that of Chad and the need to free Chad from dictatorship is not mentioned. The logic goes beyond diplomatic constraints, and the European Union in November 2013 seemed to accept the rehabilitation of Idriss Déby that has already been officially accorded at the UN. This European aid contains budgets for

¹²⁸ 11 October 2012, François Hollande, interviewed by France24, TV5 Monde and RFI <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20121011-francois-hollande-afrique-francophonie-sommet-interview-nouvelle-page>, <http://www.elysee.fr/president/les-actualites/interviews/2012/script-interview-du-president-de-la-republique.14075.html>

¹²⁹ 5 February 2013, François Hollande to the European Parliament: <http://www.elysee.fr/videos/intervention-devant-le-parlement-europeen-2/>

¹³⁰ 31 May 2013, An exclusive Interview with François Hollande, <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130531-francois-hollande-interview-exclusive-rfi-mali-syrie-afrique-entretien-france>

¹³¹ 12 December 2013, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/EN/foraff/140007.pdf, SEAE 12 December 2013, Main results of the Council (EN): http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/140069.pdf

¹³² 15 October 2013, C.Ashton on CPDS: http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131015_01_fr.pdf, http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131015_02_en.pdf

¹³³ 7 November 2013, European Commission Press Release: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1033_en.htm

democratization and building the Rule of Law, for example human rights projects with town mayors, but reconciles itself to the lack of will on the part of dictators and the lack of long-term results. The delinking of humanitarian aid from politics also plays a role.

With regard to peace and security, a strategy based on putting pressure on dictators to push them to clean up their act in African politics is difficult to justify. Conflicts arise and are resolved according to the level of legitimacy of those who hold power. States are fragile because they have been run by kleptocrats. Above a given threshold of crime and historical responsibility, it is impossible to make a head of state put in place a reform. The slow decline in impunity allows time for other impunities to come into being, for example, if corruption continues or increases while human rights progress. **The involvement of political dictators in policies of security and peace in Africa exacerbates the struggle for influence based on personal interests.**

Since Déby has regained “international legitimacy”, he has reinforced his military strength outside Chad. He has managed to establish himself as a key player in the Central African Republic he himself destabilized.¹³⁴ **Many international diplomats are turning a blind eye to the actions of Chad in Central Africa** because it challenges the logic they promote.

The European Union would like to begin to define its Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) at the European Council of December 2013.¹³⁵ The French Presidential summit for “Peace and Security in Africa” on 5-6 December 2013 illustrates the French will to push Europe in the direction of French interests in Africa. Increasingly complementary, French and European policies seem too accommodate themselves too easily to the record of Françafrique and French compromises with dictators, to the point where the justifications underlying recent political choices need to be doubted, such as increased EU aid to Chad given to Chad without sufficient conditions. If European policy does not jolt itself awake, it could well continue to be driven by French policy under the influence of the French military in its alliances with the dictators of Françafrique. Support for democratization in Africa seems to depend to an abnormal extent on probable strengthening of Europe’s security and its arms industry.

Following the war in Mali and with the French summit on “Peace and Security” on 5-6 December 2013, **the French government is trying to make believe once again that presidents can build “peace and security” without taking into account the natures of regimes.** For the French Government, peoples deprived of credible elections are still excluded from the debate about their own security.

13. Conclusion: Idriss Déby at the Center of a Hollande version of Françafrique

On 1 October 2013, when questioned by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly, Laurent Fabius did not respond to the critical comments made about Idriss Déby by the Member of Parliament Noël Mamère.¹³⁶ He seemed to rely on an apparent “consensus” among French members of parliament about the objectives of the French intervention in Mali, which do not take into account the conditions under which the intervention took place. Yet Noël Mamère had just told him that **the French government had put itself “under obligation” to Déby:** “There are militias in the Central African Republic that are savage, brutal. These are mostly Chadian militias. Chad is headed by a scoundrel, called Idriss Déby, who tortures and liquidates his opponents, and we are now under a debt to him, because for our intervention in Mali we called on Chadian troops who are the only ones who know how to wage war in the desert.”

¹³⁴ On 23-24 March 2013, Chadian Special Forces covertly fought the CAR army and South African FOMAC peacekeeping soldiers to open a breach for the Seleka that allowed them to enter Bangui.

¹³⁵ 15 October 2013, Statement by Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the EU, about its final report on CSDP

¹³⁶ 1 October 2013, Laurent Fabius did not reply to Noël Mamère before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French National Assembly: Video: <http://videos.assemblee-nationale.fr/media.12.4667.1916775> , Laurent Fabius speech <http://basedoc.diplomatie.gouv.fr/vues/Kiosque/FranceDiplomatie/kiosque.php?fichier=bafr2013-10-10.html>

Driven by the need to succeed in the Mali intervention, without paying heed to the price to be paid, French leaders have tried to rehabilitate Déby internationally. Déby has since then tried to eliminate the little opposition that continued to resist him, helped to trigger the destabilization of the Central **African Republic**, and has accelerated the process underway in Senegal, through the Hissène Habré trial, aimed indirectly at granting him an amnesty for crimes he has committed. In October 2013, he won a seat as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. His will to take advantage of French support linked to the Malian conflict, by showing openly that he is now permitted to do whatever he wishes, also demonstrates **the impasse into which the French government has thrown itself by again confirming its alliance with this head of state.**

Have Hollande and Fabius measured the consequences of their alliance with the Chadian soldiers fighting in Mali? Demonstrating the will to work with Idriss Déby without taking into account his 23-year record as a dictator, is to send a **very strong signal of support for impunity to all African dictators.** These men have no trouble in understanding. Idriss Déby's long-term record is the worst among the ten or so dictators in France's 20 former colonies. He has escaped the International Criminal Court by doing what he knew was necessary, and because the ICC does not take into account crimes that took place prior to the Rome Statute. That the state of Chad in 2013 is so horrendous shows above all how impossible it is to reform an extreme regime. Other heads of state whose records are not as extreme have understood that they can now count on French indulgence at all levels: justice, human rights, corruption or electoral processes. That message is being sent, in particular, to the countries of *Françafrique*, to their regimes as well as to their populations.

To rehabilitate Déby is to rehabilitate every one of the dictators of *Françafrique*. To give an amnesty to the crimes of Déby is to give an amnesty for the crimes of every dictator in *Françafrique*. Idriss Déby has become the **center of the *Françafrique* of François Hollande's five-year mandate, which is a *Françafrique* of renewed military influence.**

Just how much support is France prepared to give to a regime that provides absolutely no chance for the rule of law or democracy to emerge? Will the European Union give its stamp of approval to political backsliding because it has given priority to the fight against terrorism? The French government can still change its policy in Chad and Africa. Breaking the deadlock, avoiding falling back into the vicious circle of a dysfunctional relationship between the French State and its former colonies, would necessitate a stop being put to **the provision of military and diplomatic support to dictators, and above all to Idriss Déby; active support being given to African democrats; French troops being appropriately withdrawn from Chad; by guarantees being given about the fight against the corruption of French officials in Chad; and through truth and transparency about all the crimes observed by French officials in Chad between 1982 and 2013.**

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15. *Press Release from the Collective for Solidarity with Social and Political Struggle in Africa, October 28, 2013*

Chad: How much longer will the population be kept hostage by the worst dictator in Françafrique?

The subject of applause when he stands beside François Hollande in Bamako, Idriss Déby the Chadian Dictator has just won a seat as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council: the Chadian dictator's position has been very strongly reinforced by the war in Mali. The fight against "Jihadism" in the Sahel desert was waged by an alliance between the French army and troops from the personal clan of a head of state considered one of the worst dictators in Africa. As a result of that alliance, Idriss Déby is now positioning himself as a bulwark against Islamist terror in Africa or a potential sub-contractor for military and peacekeeping operations.

Money from oil has enabled the rapid strengthening of the Chadian army since 2003, without any of the profits from oil benefiting the population, even if some infrastructure is beginning to appear above ground. According to the International Crisis Group in 2009, "...oil has become a means for the regime to strengthen its armed forces, reward its cronies and co-opt members of the political class. This has further limited the political space available to the opposition and has helped keep the country in a state of political paralysis which stokes the antagonism between the regime and its opponents."¹³⁷ The petro-state is ranked 184th out of 186 in the UNDP's Human Development Index¹³⁸. The Chadian government has announced a tripling of its oil production by 2015, which would place it at the same level as Congo- Brazzaville¹³⁹. Recently, it decided to create an investment fund of \$50 billion with the help of Samuel Maréchal, a former senior member of the French National Front¹⁴⁰. This windfall allows Déby to finance his political activities, Gaddafi-style, in Africa. He intimidates other presidents, particularly in West Africa, and in this way he undermines democracy wherever it begins to take root.

During the intervention in Mali in May 2013, Idriss Déby was allowed to crush what little opposition still existed in Chad, with very little international response¹⁴¹. However, the repression in Chad in 2013, or even the presence of the remaining Chadian child soldiers, constitute only a very small part of the record of Déby's 23 year reign: the massacres perpetrated by the ten thousand brutish soldiers of the Republican Guard, the extrajudicial executions, the executions of opponents, the villages burnt to the ground, the tortured or executed prisoners, the list is endless. A full inventory of the crimes committed is impossible to compile because human rights organizations have only partial powers of investigation in Chad. Déby has clearly guaranteed impunity to the people who carry out his orders. He is just as much in the habit of imprisoning or expelling his opponents, as he is in corrupting journalists, human rights activists and politicians, wherever he has a need, either in Chad itself or elsewhere.

The majority of the massacres took place in the 90s and were related to internal wars against uprisings which initially resulted from his previous massacres and the ethnic makeup of the army, and then were provoked by the grabbing of oil revenues by the presidential family and the impossibility of political

¹³⁷ 26 Aug 2009, International Crisis Group : Chad: Escaping from the Oil Trap,

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/chad/B065-chad-escaping-from-the-oil-trap.aspx>

¹³⁸ 28 March 2013, International Human Development Indicators, <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/TCD.html>

¹³⁹ 29 September 2013, Pétrole: le Tchad va tripler sa production, financiafrik.com/2013/09/29/petrole-le-tchad-va-tripler-sa-production-de-petrole

¹⁴⁰ 2 October 2013, M&A finance s'active au Tchad, africaintelligence.fr/LC-/holding-and-business/2013/10/02/m-afinance-s-active-au-tchad,107979217-BRE

¹⁴¹ 9 May 2013, updated 07 June 2013, FIDH, LTDH, APTDH : Chad: Crackdown on a background of military tensions, <http://fidh.org/en/africa/Chad/chad-crackdown-on-a-background-of-military-tensions-13388>

change. Some of his crimes are crimes against humanity and are not subject to a statute of limitations. The international criminal justice system was developed in the early 2000s. Idriss Déby strongly supported by Jacques Chirac until 2007, has adapted his behavior to avoid prosecution by the International Criminal Court similar to what has happened to Sudanese President al-Bashir¹⁴². In 1990, the National Commission of Inquiry established that Habré's victims numbered 40,000. **As early as 1993, Amnesty International warned about the continuity of methods between the regimes of Habré and Déby**¹⁴³. Déby has inherited Habré's immunity; especially since, as Commander in Chief of the Northern Armed Forces and security adviser to president Habré until his defection in 1989, he led some of the massacres attributed to Habré, including those of 'Black September' in 1984 in the South, and, the putting down of the MOSANAT rebel movement between 1986 and 1988 in the Guéra region. With regard to Habré's trial, Idriss Déby has already negotiated his immunity with the Extraordinary African Chambers in the courts of Senegal, where he is expected to testify against Habré¹⁴⁴.

Since 1990 the French army has not only had a front row seat in the observation of Idriss Déby's crimes, but also in protecting him. In February 1998, at Sahr in southern Chad, after the kidnapping of four French people by Mahamout Nahor, massacres were committed on Déby's orders with French soldiers nearby. With regard to the assassination in February 2008 of Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh, the leader of the democratic opposition, the French judge who led the investigation, Emmanuel Ducos, may well know the versions of the two French military advisors who were present, in particular that of Colonel Gadoullet¹⁴⁵. As Habré's crimes have increased in number, the French army has continued to cooperate with him, thus comforting his impunity and **contributing to a trivialization of his crimes against humanity**. This collaboration has helped Déby to stay in power. France has even gone so far as to save him twice through military intervention, in 2006 and 2008. In addition, to overcome the shortcomings of the Chadian government, the French army has played a positive humanitarian and social role with its "Epervier" military hospital, or when it helps in cases of fire or natural disaster¹⁴⁶.

Idriss Déby has no democratic legitimacy. He arrived by force of arms. He was installed permanently in 1996 by French experts in electoral fraud at a time when Françafrique could do anything it wanted¹⁴⁷. Since then he has learnt profitably from the experience built up by fellow dictators in the practice of fraudulent elections and crushing of all opposition. The last masquerade, endorsed by the European Union in 2011 following the labors of Louis Michel, the expert on how to hold elections in dictatorships, has brought no progress.

The democratization of Central Africa is currently impossible. The fates of Chad, the Central African Republic, Cameroon, Congo Brazzaville and Gabon are linked. Dictators are generally supportive of each other. This blocked state of affairs is also the result of the policy France has historically followed in the region to ensure its own supply of oil. At the moment, the European Union, which would like to start work on the defense policy it intends to present to the European Council in December, is driven by French politics, under military influence, in its alliances with the dictators of Françafrique. Democratization has

¹⁴² September 2008, U.N. "Human rights situations that require the Council's attention: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Sudan: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G08/153/54/PDF/G0815354.pdf?OpenElement>

¹⁴³ 21 April 1993, CHAD, Amnesty international calls for a full inquiry into army killings in the south in 1993, <http://www.amnesty.org/fr/library/asset/AFR20/016/1993/fr/1a533fc5-f90c-11dd-92e7-c59f81373cf2/af200161993en.pdf>

¹⁴⁴ 30 September 2013, Jean Bernard Padaré : l'avocat qui construit scientifiquement la perte d'Idriss Déby ITNO—Jean-Bernard Padaré, the lawyer who is bringing about the scientific loss of Idriss Déby ITNO", <http://www.ndjamena-matin.com/article-tchad-jean-bernard-padare-l-avocat-qui-construit-scientifiquement-la-perde-d-idriss-deby-itno-120325040.html>

¹⁴⁵ September 2009, Amnesty : "Disparitions forcées au Tchad—Enforced Disappearances in Chad": [amnesty.org/sites/default/files/SF09MA084_tchad.pdf](http://www.amnesty.org/sites/default/files/SF09MA084_tchad.pdf), + Amnesty International Report 2009, Chad: Enforced Disappearances, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/chad/report-2009>, + 5 March 2013, Survie : Déby redevient fréquentable, l'impunité de ses crimes demeure, survie.org/billets-d-afrique/2013/221-fevrier-2013/article/deby-redevient-frequentable-l

¹⁴⁶ 28 July 2011, Vers une redéfinition de la présence militaire française au Tchad ?—Towards a redesign of the French Military Presence in Chad?": <http://www.france24.com/fr/20110728-dispositif-epervier-dispositif-alain-juppe-tchad-presence-militaire-francaise-aqmi>

¹⁴⁷ Jérôme Grand d'Esnon and André Rouge, Verschave, Noir Chirac, 2002, p225 chap. "Légitimer le frère Déby, bourreau des Tchadiens - Legitimizing brother Déby, Executioner of the Chadians"

been sacrificed in favor of strengthening European security and its arms industry. The French government is trying to make believe (once again) that presidents can build “peace and stability” without taking into account the nature of their regimes. The populations of these countries, deprived of credible elections, are still excluded from the debate about their own security. As a result of regaining a little “international legitimacy” Déby has both increased his external military strength and has managed to establish himself as the key player in the Central African Republic (CAR) he himself destabilized¹⁴⁸.

On 29 October 2013, Chad will undergo the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of the UN in Geneva¹⁴⁹. This review, which is not directly binding, will evaluate what progress has been made in the establishment of the rule of law in Chad. Idriss Déby, even when accused directly, and liable to be held responsible, only lets his regime change very slowly. The recommendations made to the UPR by Amnesty International reveal the true nature of the regime and the paralyzing horror that the population has lived through for the last 23 years¹⁵⁰. Although the UPR does not ask directly for truth and justice for all the crimes committed by the Chadian regime the rapid implementation of its recommendations is essential.

The Collective for Solidarity with Social and Political Struggle in Africa calls on the French government to urgently change its policy towards Chad by:

- Halting its diplomatic and military support to Idriss Déby
- Providing active support to Chadian Democrats, and the establishment of the rule of law according to the recommendations of the Universal Periodic Review
- Withdrawal of French troops from Chad
- Providing total transparency at the Habré trial with regard to all crimes reported by French officials in Chad between 1982 and 2013, with details of the victims of the events of February 2008 including those of Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh.

Collective for Solidarity with Social and Political Struggles in Africa

19 signatures: Forces Vives tchadiennes en exil, Rassemblement National Républicain (RNR, Tchad), Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC), Comité d’Action pour la Conquête de la Démocratie en Centrafrique (CACDCA), Fédération des Congolais de la Diaspora (Congo Brazzaville), Mouvement pour le Renouveau Démocratique (MRD, Djibouti, coalition Union pour le Salut National (USN)), Alliance Républicaine pour le Développement (ARD, Djibouti, coalition Union pour le Salut National (USN)), Ca suffit comme ça ! (Gabon), Mouvement pour la Restauration Démocratique en Guinée Equatoriale (MRD), Forum Citoyenneté Monde arabe (FCMA), Amicale panafricaine, Plateforme Panafricaine, Sortir du Colonialisme, Afriques en lutte, Parti Communiste Français (PCF), Parti de Gauche, Fédération pour une Alternative Sociale et Ecologique (FASE), Europe Ecologie les Verts.

¹⁴⁸ On 23 & 24 March 2013, the Chadian special forces clandestinely fought against the Central African army and South African soldiers of the FOMAC peacekeeping mission to create an opening in their lines through which the Seleka was allowed to enter Bangui, 8 October 2013, AFP : “La Centrafrique, une affaire de sécurité nationale pour N’Djamena” :

http://liberation.fr/monde/2013/10/08/la-centrafrique-une-affaire-de-securite-nationale-pour-n-djamena_937823

¹⁴⁹ 29 October 2013, Chad Universal Periodic Review, U.N. Geneva, <http://www.upr-info.org/-Chad-.html>

¹⁵⁰ 31 July 2013, “Suggested recommendations to States considered in the 17th round of the Universal Periodic Review, 21 October-1 November, 2013”, <http://amnesty.org/en/library/asset/IOR41/012/2013/en/bb433783-ef38-4cdc-8d6a-474f74b057d6/ior410122013fr.html>

16. Presentation of the Collective for Solidarity with Social and Political Struggle in Africa – Paris

<http://www.electionsafrique.org/>
<http://electionsafrique.org/Presentation-du-collectif-mise-a.html>

The Collective for Solidarity with Social and Political Struggle in Africa has met monthly since 2009 in Paris. Its role is to support African democrats in the framework of a profound need for reform of French policy. It has participated in many events and demonstrations since 2009. Since the beginning it has worked on elections, electoral processes and electoral fraud. It has created a space for collective reflection and debate and discussion between French and African political parties and associations.

The Collective for Solidarity with Social and Political Struggle in Africa has been most notably involved in the following events and crises, with a focus on electoral processes. The communiqués below are in French:

November 2013, Togo, communiqué on Faure Gnassingbé at Elysée:

<http://electionsafrique.org/Communique-et-si-le-terroriste-au.html>

October 2013, communiqué on French policy in Chad

<http://electionsafrique.org/communique-Tchad-combien-de-temps.html>

Cameroon in September 2013, communiqué on the parliamentary elections:

<http://www.electionsafrique.org/Communique-Cameroun-legislatives.html>

July 2013, French policy in Africa, communiqué on military influence

<http://www.electionsafrique.org/Communique-Sortir-de-l-influence.html>

May 2013, Equatorial Guinea elections: a communiqué on oil and elections

<http://www.electionsafrique.org/Communique-du-Collectif-Guinee.html>

April 2013, Togo, Fire in Lomé Togo Market, a letter to French Minister for Foreign Affairs Fabius

<http://www.electionsafrique.org/Togo-Lettre-du-collectif-a-Laurent.html>

February 2013, Djibouti, Togo, Cameroon, Guinea parliamentary elections, an open letter to the French National Assembly

<http://www.electionsafrique.org/Elections-legislatives-a-Djibouti.html>

February 2013, Djibouti, parliamentary elections, press release

<http://www.electionsafrique.org/Elections-legislatives-du-22.html>

January 2013, Togo, parliamentary elections, a collective open letter to the European Union

<http://www.electionsafrique.org/Togo-elections-legislatives-Lettre.html>

July 2012, Congo Brazzaville, parliamentary elections, a press release from the collective

<http://www.electionsafrique.org/Elections-legislatives-des-15-et.html>

December 2011, Gabon, parliamentary elections: an information kit written by the French NGO Survie

<http://www.electionsafrique.org/Dossier-d-information-Legislatives.html>

October 2011, Cameroon, presidential election, an information kit, participant mobilization and organization of a meeting

<http://www.electionsafrique.org/Election-presidentielle-du-9.html>

2010: Fifty years of Independences, participant mobilizations, including one event on July 14, 2010:

<http://www.electionsafrique.org/Manifestation-du-13-Juillet-2010.html>

March 2010, Togo, presidential elections, participant mobilizations, a communiqué of advocacy to the European Union

<http://www.electionsafrique.org/Togo-Election-presidentielle-du-28.html>

June 2009, Mauritania, a statement from the Collective

<http://www.electionsafrique.org/Mauritanie-declaration-du.html>